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Abstract
The proliferation of Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITSs) applications, such as
Internet access and Infotainment, highlights the requirements for improving the underly-
ing mobility management protocols for Vehicular Ad Hoc Networks (VANETs). Mobility
management protocols in VANETs are envisioned to support mobile nodes (MNs), i.e.,
vehicles, with seamless communications, in which service continuity is guaranteed while
vehicles are roaming through different RoadSide Units (RSUs) with heterogeneous wireless
technologies.
Due to its standardization and widely deployment, IP mobility (also called Mobile IP
(MIP)) is the most popular mobility management protocol used for mobile networks includ-
ing VANETs. In addition, because of the diversity of possible applications, the Internet
Engineering Task Force (IETF) issues many MIP’s standardizations, such as MIPv6 and
NEMO for global mobility, and Proxy MIP (PMIPv6) for localized mobility. However,
many challenges have been posed for integrating IP mobility with VANETs, including the
vehicle’s high speeds, multi-hop communications, scalability, and efficiency. From a security
perspective, we observe three main challenges: 1) each vehicle’s anonymity and location
privacy , 2) authenticating vehicles in multi-hop communications, and 3) physical-layer
location privacy.
In transmitting mobile IPv6 binding update signaling messages, the mobile node’s Home
Address (HoA) and Care-of Address (CoA) are transmitted as plain-text, hence they can
be revealed by other network entities and attackers. The mobile node’s HoA and CoA
represent its identity and its current location, respectively, therefore revealing an MN’s HoA
means breaking its anonymity while revealing an MN’s CoA means breaking its location
privacy. On one hand, some existing anonymity and location privacy schemes require
intensive computations, which means they cannot be used in such time-restricted seamless
communications. On the other hand, some schemes only achieve seamless communication
through low anonymity and location privacy levels. Therefore, the trade-off between the
network performance, on one side, and the MN’s anonymity and location privacy, on the
other side, makes preservation of privacy a challenging issue. In addition, for PMIPv6
to provide IP mobility in an infrastructure-connected multi-hop VANET, an MN uses a
relay node (RN) for communicating with its Mobile Access Gateway (MAG). Therefore,
a mutual authentication between the MN and RN is required to thwart authentication
attacks early in such scenarios. Furthermore, for a NEMO-based VANET infrastructure,
which is used in public hotspots installed inside moving vehicles, protecting physical-layer
location privacy is a prerequisite for achieving privacy in upper-layers such as the IP-layer.
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Due to the open nature of the wireless environment, a physical-layer attacker can easily
localize users by employing signals transmitted from these users.
In this dissertation, we address those security challenges by proposing three security
schemes to be employed for different mobility management scenarios in VANETs, namely,
the MIPv6, PMIPv6, and Network Mobility (NEMO) protocols.
First, for MIPv6 protocol and based on the onion routing and anonymizer, we propose
an anonymous and location privacy-preserving scheme (ALPP) that involves two comple-
mentary sub-schemes: anonymous home binding update (AHBU) and anonymous return
routability (ARR). In addition, anonymous mutual authentication and key establishment
schemes have been proposed, to authenticate a mobile node to its foreign gateway and
create a shared key between them. Unlike existing schemes, ALPP alleviates the tradeoff
between the networking performance and the achieved privacy level. Combining onion
routing and the anonymizer in the ALPP scheme increases the achieved location privacy
level, in which no entity in the network except the mobile node itself can identify this
node’s location. Using the entropy model, we show that ALPP achieves a higher degree of
anonymity than that achieved by the mix-based scheme. Compared to existing schemes,
the AHBU and ARR sub-schemes achieve smaller computation overheads and thwart both
internal and external adversaries. Simulation results demonstrate that our sub-schemes
have low control-packets routing delays, and are suitable for seamless communications.
Second, for the multi-hop authentication problem in PMIPv6-based VANET, we pro-
pose EM3A, a novel mutual authentication scheme that guarantees the authenticity of both
MN and RN. EM3A thwarts authentication attacks, including Denial of service (DoS), col-
lusion, impersonation, replay, and man-in-the-middle attacks. EM3A works in conjunction
with a proposed scheme for key establishment based on symmetric polynomials, to gener-
ate a shared secret key between an MN and an RN. This scheme achieves lower revocation
overhead than that achieved by existing symmetric polynomial-based schemes. For a PMIP
domain with n points of attachment and a symmetric polynomial of degree t, our scheme
achieves t × 2n-secrecy, whereas the existing symmetric polynomial-based authentication
schemes achieve only t-secrecy. Computation and communication overhead analysis as well
as simulation results show that EM3A achieves low authentication delay and is suitable
for seamless multi-hop IP communications. Furthermore, we present a case study of a
multi-hop authentication PMIP (MA-PMIP) implemented in vehicular networks. EM3A
represents the multi-hop authentication in MA-PMIP to mutually authenticate the roaming
vehicle and its relay vehicle. Compared to other authentication schemes, we show that our
MA-PMIP protocol with EM3A achieves 99.6% and 96.8% reductions in authentication
delay and communication overhead, respectively.
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Finally, we consider the physical-layer location privacy attacks in the NEMO-based
VANETs scenario, such as would be presented by a public hotspot installed inside a mov-
ing vehicle. We modify the obfuscation, i.e., concealment, and power variability ideas and
propose a new physical-layer location privacy scheme, the fake point-cluster based scheme,
to prevent attackers from localizing users inside NEMO-based VANET hotspots. Involv-
ing the fake point and cluster based sub-schemes, the proposed scheme can: 1) confuse
the attackers by increasing the estimation errors of their Received Signal Strength (RSSs)
measurements, and 2) prevent attackers’ monitoring devices from detecting the user’s trans-
mitted signals. We show that our scheme not only achieves higher location privacy, but
also increases the overall network performance. Employing correctness, accuracy, and cer-
tainty as three different metrics, we analytically measure the location privacy achieved by
our proposed scheme. In addition, using extensive simulations, we demonstrate that the
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In recent years, both academic and industry have shown significant interest in the field of
mobility management for vehicular networks achieving seamless communications for mobile
nodes (MNs), i.e., vehicles [4]. Mobility management protocols, such as Mobile IPv6
(MIPv6) and the NEtwork MObility (NEMO) protocols, have been proposed by many
consortia as well as standards organizations, including the Car-to-Car Communications
Consortium (C2C-CC) [5] and the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). In addition,
industry integrates these mobility management protocols with Vehicular Ad Hoc Networks
(VANETs) [6] to support Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITSs) applications, including
Internet access, real-time traffic information, video streaming, and infotainment. However,
integrating mobility management with VANET as a kind of not only mobile, but also
heterogeneous networks [7], poses challenges - vehicles change their points of attachments
frequently, which causes the network topology to be changed abruptly.
The security and privacy preservations have been considered as important challenges
in this mobility management-VANETs integration. Spending at least two hours per day in
vehicles, passengers prefer using the ITS applications, however, most of them are concerned
about their privacy when using these applications. Current mobility management stan-
dards, namely Mobile IP (MIP) and its updates, rely on the IPSec protocol, which supports
authentication and data privacy and security services in a limited way. For example, the
industry reports the lack of wide adoption of the MIPv6 protocol due to the problems with
interoperability in IPSec implementations. In addition, implementing IPSec with VANETs
increases the vehicle’s handover delay, which in turn prevents seamless communications for
real-time applications.
1
1.1 IP Mobility Management for Vehicular Networks
The first trend to support nodes’ mobility was through the MIP protocols, due to their
standardizations and widely deployment. However, security, resource overhead, and scal-
ability have been reported as MIP’s shortcomings, due to the dual role of the IP address
as a mobile node’s identity and location. Therefore, IETF issues many MIP updates,
such as Proxy MIPv6 (PMIPv6) and Hierarchial MIPv6 (HMIPv6), to ameliorate MIP’s
problems [8].
In addition, many alternatives such as locator/ID separation protocol (LISP) [9], Host
Identity Protocol (HIP) [10], and Mobility and Multihoming Supporting Identifier Locator
Split Architecture (MILSA) [11], have been proposed. The main idea is to separate the
MN’s identity and location, in order to achieve better network performance than that
achieved with the dual-role MIP standards. LISP (as well as Virtual ID [12]) allows the
MN to communicate with a mapping server that maintains an identifier-locator mapping in
order to get the locator of the correspondent node’s identifier. In addition, HIP introduces
a cryptographic-based public key to represent the MN’s identity, while the IP address is
used only as a locator. The domain name server (DNS) maintains the binding between the
MNs’ identities and locators, hence, another network delay is added because the DNS is a
single point of failure and overload. Relying on changing the MN’s stack, the MILSA [11]
separates the MN’s identifier, represented by a Hierarchial URI-like Identifier (HUI), and
its locator, represented by the IP address. The HUI is used by the transport layer, and its
mapping to the IP address is performed by a mapping sub-layer into the network layer.
IP mobility management for VANETs involves location management used to track the
vehicle’s location and to enable packet reception, and handover management used to sup-
port seamless handover. In this kind of handovers, also called seamless communications,
the vehicle’s connection to the infrastructure is kept active while the vehicle moves and
changes its point of attachment. More specifically, the seamless handover [13,14] is a ver-
tical handover process in which vehicles are roaming along heterogeneous access networks,
such as IEEE 802.11p, WiMaX, and WiFi. When using this time-restricted handover pro-
cess, both mobile node and service provider have some benefits, including low cost, wide
coverage, and high bandwidth. Therefore, many ITS applications such as infotainment and
video-streaming download empoly the seamless handover, supported by the MIP protocols,
to increase networking performance.
2
1.1.1 Mobile Applications in VANETs
In Vehicular Ad hoc Networks (VANET), a vehicle that is equipped with an On-Board
Unit (OBU) communicates with other vehicles via a Vehicle-to-Vehicle (V2V) domain, and
communicates with a Roadside Unit (RSU) via a vehicle-to-Infrastructure (V2I) domain.
V2V and V2I communication domains are mainly for safety VANET applications, such
as road accident notifications and weather warnings. In addition, non-safety VANET
applications, such as service infotainment and Internet access, have recently received a
great deal of attention. Seamless mobile applications in VENETs are presented as follows:
• Video streaming
Downloading video files, anywhere anytime, is one of the most important features for
wireless video applications. However, wireless video applications face some perfor-
mance problems [15] due to the lossy nature of the wireless channel, which increases
the transmission error rate. There are two types of wireless video applications: real-
time interactive applications such as video conferences, and video streaming appli-
cations such as live multimedia files. The solution to decrease the error rate is to
apply an error concealment technique in order to hide the error. Passengers can
download multimedia files via RSUs to vehicles driving through. In addition, live
news or football matches can also be watched.
• Online gaming
Passengers sitting in different vehicles can enjoy playing online games on the roads.
• Wireless VoIP
Voice communication is one of the most important applications in wireless networks.
However, voice over IP (VoIP) on a wireless requires interoperability between the
circuit-switched GSM network and the H.323 IP network. Compared to the tradi-
tional VoIP in GSM, the VoIP on wireless [15] costs more and requires more functions,
because it requires dynamic reservation of the network’s resources for the path from
the sender to the receiver. This dynamicity is a result of the user mobility. More-
over, VoIP on wireless also requires more advanced encoding algorithms to support
the voice traffic on the IP networks. More specifically, wireless VoIP is an open re-
search area due to the trade-off between the interoperability requirements and the
high level of performance that is required with real-time voice communications.
• Wireless file systems
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The main requirement in a wireless file system is that the wireless file transmission
should not be disconnected while the mobile device moves among different wireless
networks. In other words, the availability of the file system is a challenge due to
the mobility of the wireless devices. Moreover, when attempting to download videos,
mobile devices may encounter a problem connecting to the server. To solve this
problem, disconnected and weakly connected operations can be used [15].
• Location dependent applications
There are three types of mobile location applications [15]: 1) in-vehicle mobile loca-
tion applications, 2) personal mobile location applications, and 3) government mobile
location applications. The in-vehicle mobile location applications are high-mobility
applications in vehicular Ad hoc networks. Emergency service and stolen car location
services are examples of those applications. Moreover, the personal mobile location
services (e. g., personal location tracking) are low mobility applications. The gov-
ernment location mobile applications (e. g., road pricing system) are applications
that are presented by governments.
1.2 Research Challenges
Securing mobility management protocols for VANETs is a challenging process due to the
unique characteristics of VANETs that conflict with the IP mobility, and hence prevent us-
ing traditional security algorithms. As a kind of mobile network, the mobility management-
based VANET’s security requirements are described herein:
1. Authentication: Each mobile node, i.e., vehicle, must be able to authenticate itself
to both its home agent and the correspondent node communicating with it. More-
over, the mobile node requires the ability to authenticate the source of its received
data. The mutual authentication requirement protects mobile IPv6 users from im-
personation and masking attacks.
2. Communication privacy: Communication among the mobile node, the home
agent, and the correspondent node should be confidential, and an intermediate eaves-
dropper should not learn the content of the transmitted data.
3. Message integrity: Active attacks should be prevented by message integrity mech-
anisms, by which the mobile node guarantees that the received data is not modified
during transmission.
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4. Anonymity and location privacy: The mobile node must guarantee its anonymity
in the network. The anonymity of a network is the ability to hide a specific item
among a group of similar items, and location privacy is the ability to prevent tracking
a user’s mobility. Anonymity and location privacy prevent a traffic analysis attacks
from learning the identity or the location of the mobile node.
5. Payment protocol: The roaming mobile nodes always use the foreign networks’
resources, therefore a payment protocol is required to charge the mobile node. The
payment protocol must be secure in protecting the location privacy of the mobile
node; moreover, the mobile node must authenticate the network operator before
paying for the service.
6. Revocable privacy vs. perfect privacy: Although perfect privacy is required to
ensure a high level of security, revocable privacy is also needed in any case where
the mobile node disputes payment. In revocable privacy techniques, there must be
at least one entity in the network that can revoke the privacy of the mobile node at
any time.
1.2.1 Mobility Management Challenges
When integrating IP mobility with VANETs, the following challenges occur [16]:
Seamless mobility with high speed VANETs
Due to the high speeds of vehicles and hence the increase of number of handovers,
applying seamless mobility in VANETs becomes more challenging. Fast handover is re-
quired to decrease the delay in ITS applications, so the accessability and service continuity
are guaranteed regardless of the vehicle’s location and the wireless technology. PMIPv6
and NEMO protocols are the most suitable mobility protocols for the ITS in VANETs,
while the MIPv6 protocol encounters high signaling overhead. New adaptations in the
MIPv6 protocol have been standardized, such as FMIPv6 and HMIPv6, with the goal of
decreasing the handover delay by early detection of the vehicle’s roaming. In addition,
the PMIPv6 protocol decreases the overhead by introducing local mobility that serves the
MN’s roaming inside one PMIP domain. However, the signaling overhead increases when
the MN moves through multiple domains. Furthermore, the NEMO protocol has been
used in many ITS projects, such as C2C-CC, in which the Mobile Router (MR) performs
the signaling operations on behalf of the Mobile Network Nodes (MNNs) that only imple-
ment IPv6 without any mobility functions. However, the problem of nested NEMO [17],
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in which signals from nested MRs travel through all parent MR’s home agents, increases
the seamless communication delay.
IPv6-based multi-hop VANETs
In early research, the focus was to support IP mobility for VANET where there is a
direct connection between the vehicle and the RSU , i.e., a one-hop connection [18, 19].
However, with the proliferation of Vehicle-to-Vehicle-to-Infrastructure (V2V2I) communi-
cations, the need for the multi-hop VANETs increases. New challenges in applying IP
mobility are described below [20]:
• The operations and performance of IP in the current 802.11p/WAVE VANET stan-
dard has not been identified clearly yet.
• IP mobility support for the multi-hop environment adds complexity to VANET sce-
narios with a short duration multi-hop connections, given the high-speed VANETs.
• Asymmetric links are difficult to be implemented in V2V2I communications.
• The intermediate vehicle has a lack of motivation to forward generated data to other
vehicles.
• Heterogeneity in vehicular networks is not only in wireless technology, but also in
type of equipments and applications.
Scalability and efficiency
Vehicular networks could be very large in size, where thousands of vehicles may com-
municate together. In addition, the frequent changes of the point of attachment for each
vehicle coupled with the vehicle high speeds, affect the VANET topology, therefore the IP
mobility protocol needs to be scalable and efficient in signalling overhead during handover,
in order to support service continuity and seamless communications for vehicles.
1.2.2 Security Challenges
Vehicle’s anonymity and location privacy
Previous studies have attempted to secure the mobility signaling in mobile networks
by focusing on the authentication and integrity problems only [21–24]. Moreover, much
recent research work has been done on anonymity and location privacy problems [25–27].
As mentioned in [28, 29], location privacy threats vary from a simple interference with
6
personal activities and habits, to a more dangerous physical attack after identifying a
person and his favorite locations.
In transmitting mobile IPv6 binding update messages, both the mobile node’s HoA
and CoA are transmitted as plain-text, hence they can be revealed by network entities
and attackers. The mobile node’s HoA and CoA represent its identity and its current
location respectively. Therefore, revealing an MN’s HoA means breaking its anonymity
and revealing an MN’s CoA means breaking its location privacy. On one hand, some
existing anonymity and location privacy schemes [30–33] require intensive computations,
hence, they cannot be used in the time-restricted seamless handovers occurring in mobile
networks such as VANETs. On the other hand, some other schemes [34, 35] achieve
low anonymity and location privacy levels. Therefore, the trade-off between the network
performance on one side and the MN’s anonymity and location privacy on the other side
makes privacy preserving a challenging issue.
Authenticating vehicles in multi-hop communications
In order to support seamless communications, an adaptation for IP mobility manage-
ment protocol, such as Proxy Mobile IPv6 (PMIP), has been proposed in [36] to provide
IP mobility support in an infrastructure-connected multi-hop vehicular network. In such
a multi-hop PMIP network, an MN uses a Relay Node (RN) for communicating with its
Mobile Access Gateway (MAG) (i.e., the point of attachment to the infrastructure). The
existing authentication schemes that can authenticate this MN to its MAG , use the RN
to only forward the authentication credentials between MN and MAG. However, an extra
mutual authentication, between MN and RN, is required to thwart authentication attacks
early.
Without that authentication, the mobile node may initiate a denial of service (DoS)
attack toward the MAG, or the RN may initiate a fraud attack to mislead the MN. In mobile
environments, DoS and fraud attacks can cause service disruptions and financial losses,
due to resources’ exhaustion and high end-to-end delay [37]. The difficulty of generating a
security association between MN and RN, which are arbitrary nodes and have not met each
other before, makes proposing an authentication-preserving scheme a challenge. Moreover,
if public-key authentication schemes are employed for this MN-RN authentication, they
would require a large delay that cannot be tolerated by seamless vehicular communications.
Physical-layer location privacy attacks
In addition to the location privacy mechanisms implemented in the network layer in
order to protect MNs while roaming among different networks, we observe that other mech-
anisms are required to thwart lower-layers location privacy attackers, such as triangulation
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attackers, that localize the senders from the strength of their transmitted signals. Trian-
gulation attackers can be found when applying NEMO protocol to support public hotspots
inside moving vehicles.
Two benefits can be acquired when integrating the NEMO protocol With VANET:
commercial and performance. Commercially, the cost of achieving the mobility function in
NEMO-based VANET decreases, because the passengers’ devices do not need to implement
the NEMO protocol. The OBU is the only entity that implements NEMO protocol, because
it works as the hotspot’s Mobile Router (MR) and manages the mobility of the whole
network as one unit. In addition, the network performance increases because NEMO-
based VANET achieves a lower message routing delay for each user than that achieved
when using a host mobility protocol like MIPv6. Therefore, unlike the MIPv6 protocol,
NEMO-based VANETs can be used for supporting real-time applications such as video
streaming download. Despite the aforementioned benefits, preserving user location privacy
in such a public mobile hotspot for NEMO-based VANET is a challenge.
Specific to the NEMO-based VANETs hotspots, controlling information leakage at the
physical-layer is important to ensure user’s location privacy in wireless LANs, even with
applying confidentiality to the data-link layer [38]. Due to the open nature of the wireless
environment, a physical-layer attacker can easily localize users from the strength of their
transmitted signals. Being supported with isotropic antennas, which emit signals in all
directions, users’ mobile devices in hotspots cannot hide their transmitted signals from
physical-layer attackers. In addition, with the recently extensive researches that have
been done to increase the accuracy of positioning systems used to localize mobile devices
in location-based services, physical-layer location privacy attacks become more difficult
to mitigate because they exploit these high-accuracy positioning systems to localize the
victims. Using cheap equipment such as a Received Signal Strength Indicator (RSSI), the
attacker can easily localize the sender by only acquiring its transmitted wireless signals
even if an IP-layer security scheme is implemented [39]. Furthermore, existing physical-
layer location privacy schemes are limited to power variability [40] that uses different
power levels in transmitting packets, obfuscation [41] that confuses attackers by replacing
real location information with fake, and adding noise [42] that decreases the accuracy of
sender’s localization to noise ratio.
Those schemes are not appropriate for NEMO-based VANET hotspots. Power vari-
ability schemes have been proven as weak solutions, because attackers can easily reveal
the original signals’ powers. In addition, existing obfuscation schemes disguise the exact
user’s location by returning to the attacker an expanded area in which the user is located.
However, in NEMO-based VANET hotspots, location privacy attackers can get the exact
users’ locations instead of an obfuscated area with the help of the high-accuracy positioning
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schemes. Furthermore, adding noise to transmitted signals decreases the overall network
performance.
1.3 Thesis Motivations and Contributions
Securing mobility management for VANETs is an important research area to get the bene-
fits of the ITS applications. Despite the studies that have been done to improve VANETs’
performance and seamless communications through different mobility management proto-
cols, the security issue for such mobile networks is still an open research area. Therefore,
in this dissertation, we address the security challenges that are mentioned in Section 1.2.2
by proposing three security schemes to be employed for different mobility management sce-
narios in VANETs, namely, MIPv6, PMIPv6, and Network Mobility (NEMO) protocols.
The thesis contributions are described as follows:
1. For MIPv6 protocol, we propose an anonymous and location privacy preserving
scheme (ALPP) [43] that consists of two complementary sub-schemes: anonymous
home binding update (AHBU) and anonymous return routability (ARR). In addi-
tion, anonymous mutual authentication and key establishment schemes have been
proposed to work in conjunction with ALPP to authenticate a mobile node to its
foreign gateway and create a shared key between them. ALPP adds anonymity and
location privacy services to mobile IPv6 signaling to achieve mobile senders and re-
ceivers privacy. Unlike existing schemes, ALPP alleviates the trade-off between the
networking performance and the achieved privacy level. Combining onion routing and
the anonymizer in the ALPP scheme increases the achieved location privacy level, in
which no entity in the network except the mobile node itself can identify this node’s
location. Using the entropy model, we show that ALPP achieves a higher degree
of anonymity than that achieved by the mix-based scheme. Compared to existing
schemes, both AHBU and ARR sub-schemes require less computation overhead, and
thwart both internal and external adversaries. Simulation results demonstrate that
our schemes have low control-packet routing delays, and are suitable for the seamless
handover.
2. For the multi-hop authentication problem in PMIPv6, we propose EM3A [21], a novel
mutual authentication scheme that guarantees the authenticity of both MN and RN.
EM3A thwarts authentication attacks, including DoS, colluding, impersonating, re-
play, and man-in-the-middle attacks. EM3A works in conjunction with a proposed
scheme for key establishment, based on symmetric polynomials, to generate a shared
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secret key between MN and RN. This scheme achieves lower revocation overhead than
that achieved by existing symmetric polynomial-based schemes. For a PMIP domain
with n points of attachment and a symmetric polynomial of degree t, our scheme
achieves t× 2n−secrecy, whereas the existing symmetric polynomial-based authenti-
cation schemes achieve only t−secrecy. Computation and communication overhead
analysis as well as simulation results show that EM3A achieves low authentication
delay and is suitable for seamless multi-hop IP communications.
3. For physical-layer location privacy attacks in NEMO-based VANETs, we modify
the obfuscation, i.e., concealment, and power variability ideas and propose a new
physical-layer location privacy scheme, the fake point-cluster based scheme, to pre-
vent attackers from localizing users inside NEMO-based VANET hotspots. The pro-
posed scheme involves fake point and cluster based sub-schemes, and its goal is to
confuse the attackers by increasing the estimation errors of their RSS measurements,
and to prevent attackers’ monitoring devices from detecting the sender’s transmitted
signals. Using the correctness, accuracy, and certainty metrics, we show that the
fake point-cluster based scheme achieves high location privacy in the MNN. In ad-
dition, our extensive simulations show that the fake point-cluster based scheme can
be implemented in reality, due to the high possibility of having many MNNs select
the same fake points and hence increasing the attacker’s confusion. Compared to the
fake point sub-scheme, our proposed scheme achieves 23% and 37% decreases in the
average sender’s power and the MNN-AP route path length, respectively.
1.4 Thesis Outlines
This thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 reviews the three mobility management
protocols that will be used in our proposed security schemes: MIPv6, PMIPv6, and NEMO
protocol. In addition, the vehicular IP address configuration methods are explained in this
chapter. The first proposed security scheme, ALPP, is introduced in Chapter 3. In Chapter
4 , we present our EM3A scheme as well as a case study, which is the MA-PMIP protocol
for IP services provision in asymmetric vehicular networks. The fake point-cluster based
scheme is proposed in Chapter 5 to thwart the physical layer location privacy attackers
in NEMO-based VANETs. Finally, Chapter 6 gives the conclusions of this research and
outlines our future work.
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Chapter 2
Background and Related Work
Due to their wide deployment, Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITSs) receive a great
deal of attention from many organizations, such as the Institute of Electrical and Electronic
Engineers (IEEE), International Standard Organization (ISO), and the European car in-
dustry. Therefore, sharing the same frequency band of 5.9 GHz, many VANETs protocol
stacks - such as IEEE Wireless Access in Vehicular Environment (WAVE), ISO CALIM,
and Car to Car Communication Consortium (C2C-CC) - have been recently proposed [1]
for ITSs. For example, Figure 2.1 shows the C2C-CC architecture that is used for the
ETSI ITS. As depicted in the figure, the IPv6 protocol is a common factor for all VANET
architectures including the C2C-CC, because of its wide use by vehicular applications.
With the goal of supporting vehicles with Internet applications and communications, the
integration of the MIP and VANET is performed through three functionalities: 1) vehicular
IP address configuration , 2) IP mobility mechanisms, and 3) forwarding IP packets among
vehicular networks. The first functionality, vehicular IP address configuration, supports a
vehicle with a unique and permanent IP address, which the vehicle uses inside its home
network. The second functionality, IP mobility mechanism, manages the mobility of the
auto-configured vehicle while roaming across many networks, and keeps its connectivity to
the Internet. Finally, the third functionality, forwarding IP datagrams, helps the vehicle in
forwarding its IP packets through vehicle routing schemes. In this thesis, we focus on the
second functionality, IP mobility, however in this chapter we briefly review the IP auto-
configuration addresses to vehicles because it is a prerequisite not only for IP mobility, but








































Figure 2.1: Car to Car Communication Consortium (C2C-CC) [1]
2.1 Vehicular IP Address Configurations
Due to the challenges of the VANET multi-hop nature and the lack of multicast commu-
nications, traditional IP stateless and stateful auto-configuration schemes cannot be used
to assign unique IP addresses to vehicles. In addition, auto-configuration IP addresses
schemes for Mobile Ad hoc Networks (MANETs) add high configuration delays and hence
are not suitable to be used in VANETs [44]. Therefore, the configuration of IP address
in VANETs is a key research issue. For the Internet-based VANETs applications such as
ITS, the key requirements for IPv6 address configuration schemes can be mentioned as
follows [45]:
1. Configure a globally valid address.
2. Present low complexity.
3. Decrease signaling overhead.
4. Suitable for movement detection
5. Provide gateway selection for the vehicle in the case where multiple RSUs are reach-
able
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6. Executed in a fully-distributed fashion to prevent single point of failure (Security)
7. Provide authentication and integrity of the signalling messages (Security)
8. Protect the privacy of the vehicles (Security)
Existing IP address configuration schemes for VANETs are classified into centralized,
distributed, and geographical based schemes. Both centralized and distributed schemes
rely on the Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP), while the geographical based
scheme relies on the vehicles’ geographic locations.
2.1.1 Distributed IPv6 Vehicular Configuration
The Vehicular Address Configuration (VAC) [46] is the first distributed IPv6 vehicular
configuration scheme that depends on the VANET topology and the DHCP enhancement.
Instead of having a DHCP server for the whole network, VAC creates a leader chain among
the communicating vehicles. Each leader works as a DHCP server to support vehicles in
its coverage area with an IP address. The number of vehicles under a leader’s coverage
area is determined by a SCOPE, that is a number of hops defined by each leader. An
ordinary vehicle may become a leader if the number of hops to its leader is larger than a
max-threshold of the leader’s SCOPE, and a leader may change to an ordinary vehicle if
many leaders are located near to each other. VAC supports unique IP addresses within a
defined SCOPE, however, there will be a need for a Duplicate Address Detection (DAD)
scheme to detect any vehicles that have the same IP address.
Having the same idea as the VAC scheme, the Cluster-based Addressing Scheme in
VANET (CAVET) [47] divides the VANET into clusters in order to guarantee the scalabil-
ity of the networks with the high mobility of the vehicles. CAVET is proposed mainly for
the ad hoc structure in VANET (V2V communications), in which cluster heads are respon-
sible for propagating vehicles’ packets. In addition, the Regional-based Auto-Configuration
Protocol Association with Coding Architecture for VANETs (RAPACA) [2] is used for V2I
communications, therefore, it is used along with the CAVET protocol to support V2V2I
communications in VANETs. RAPACA divides the region into clusters, with a unique
code for each area, and designs a new IPv6 distribution scheme, in which the 16 bits of
the host IP present the vehicle’s home network and the last 16 bits of the network prefix
present the cluster ID (CID), as depicted in Figure 2.2. The vehicle home network part
guarantees the uniqueness of the IP address, therefore, the DAD is no longer needed and
the signaling delay decreases. However, a scalability problem occurs because the length of
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Figure 2.2: IPv6 distribution structure. [2]
the host identity decreases to 48 bits, and hence a maximum of 248 vehicles can be assigned
with IP addresses inside each cluster.
Considering the above IPv6 address configuration requirements, the distributed IPv6
vehicular configuration schemes solve the single point of failure in the VANET as well
as present low complexity schemes, but they still have some drawbacks. The distributed
schemes require modifications in the IP stack of the node. Additionally, the signaling
overhead increases with the need for DAD schemes, and in general there is no global IP
address assigned with distributed configurations. Leaders and cluster headers are normal
vehicles in the VANET, therefore, they need to sacrifice their resources in serving other
nodes.
2.1.2 Centralized IPv6 Vehicular Configurations
The centralized Address Configuration (CAC) protocol [48] uses a centralized DHCP to
support vehicles in urban areas with unique global IP addresses. The RSUs distributed
along the road work as access points (APs) to relay the address request from the vehicle
to the DHCP server. Centralized schemes are more complex than distributed schemes, as
they rely on a single point of failure, the DHCP server. However, the signaling delay is
much lower than that in the distributed.
2.1.3 Geographical-based IPv6 Vehicular Configurations
Unlike both centralized and distributed schemes, which are stateful configurations, the
geographical based schemes are stateless auto-configurations. The Geographically Scoped
Stateless Address Configuration (GeoSAC) [45] adapts the existing IPv6 Stateless Address
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Auto-configuration (SLAAC) scheme by extending the IPv6 link to a specific geographical
area controlled by a point of attachment (AP). GeoSAC is used in many ITS architectures
such as the C2C-CC depicted in Figure 2.1, where a sub-IP layer called C2C NET is added
to resolve the VANET multi-hop nature with the IPv6 multicast transmission. The C2C
Net performs the following functions:
1. Supports multi-hop distribution by employing geographic routing, manages ad-hoc
routing, and presents a flat network topology to the IPv6 layer.
2. Configures IP broadcast domain, fixedly or on a per-packet basis, according to the
geographic parameters.
3. Defines a multicast link to represent a part of the VANET created by all nodes within
a certain geographical area.
Based on the C2C Net sub-layer, each point of attachment periodically sends IPv6
Router Advertisement (RA) messages that contain an IPv6 prefix to all nodes located
within a well-defined geographical area. When receiving the RA messages, the node’s
C2C Net applies geographic filtering and forwards the messages to other vehicles in its
geographical area. Consequently, a multi-hop path is created between the vehicles. In
addition, each node creates its IPv6 address by appending its network identifier, derived
from its MAC address, to the received IPv6 prefix. Finally the mobile node applies a DAD
scheme to ensure the uniqueness of its derived IPv6 address.
2.2 IP Mobility Management
Having the same goal of supporting global Internet connectivity for ITS applications, mo-
bility management protocols [49] can be classified into host-based and network-based mo-
bility. In host-based mobility management protocols, such as Mobile IPv6 (MIPv6) [27],
the mobile node manages its own mobility, whereas in network-based mobility protocols,
such as Proxy MIPv6 (PMIPv6) [21], the mobility of an MN is managed by network enti-
ties, such as ARs, without involving the MN. In addition, the network mobility protocol,
also called NEMO [50], is an extension of the MIPv6 protocol to manage the mobility of
the moving network as one unit.
In this thesis, the security considerations for MIPv6, PMIPv6, and NEMO in VANETs
are presented, therefore, the following sub-sections recall the three mobility management
schemes and their existing security schemes.
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2.2.1 Mobile IPv6
In roaming across “all-IP” networks that employ the IPv6 protocol, as shown in Figure
2.3, each mobile node (MN) has two different IP addresses: a home address (HoA) and
a care of address (CoA). The HoA is the original MN’s address that is configured by the
MN’s home agent (HA), which is a router located in the MN’s home network. The CoA is
acquired from a Foreign Gateway (FG), which is a router located in the visited network.
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Figure 2.3: Roaming among mobile IPv6 heterogeneous networks.
When moving out from its home network to a foreign network, an MN uses the mobile
IPv6 control messages, home binding update, and return routability messages, to perform
the seamless handover process. The home binding update control messages are sent to
the MN’s home agent, while the return routability control messages are sent to the MN’s
correspondents, which are called Correspondent Nodes (CNs). By sending these control
messages, an MN informs both its HA and its CNs about its current location, which is
represented by its CoA. Therefore, the roaming MN can receive any subsequent messages,
destined for its HoA, at this CoA. Both HA and CN create bindings between the MN’s
home address and CoA, and then transmit any subsequent messages to this CoA instead
of to the MN’s HoA.
Due to the MIPv6 highly handover latency, the IETF proposes other MIP variants such
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as the Hierarchial MIPv6 (HMIPv6) [51] and Fast MIPv6 (FMIPv6) [52] to decrease delays
and increase network performance. HMIPv6 decreases the round trip time delay in MIPv6
by choosing a Mobile Anchor Point (MAP), close to the MN, to work as the MN’s HA. In
addition to its CoA, known as Regional CoA (RCoA), the MN acquires another address
called On-link CoA (LCoA) from the MAP that controls the MN’s area. Furthermore,
this LCoA address changes as the MN moves to a new MAP’s domain. Instead of sending
frequent BU messages to its far-off HA, the MN sends local BUs to the MAP in order to
bind its LCoA with its RCoA. In addition, the MN sends a BU message to its HA to bind
its HoA and RCoA. The BU messages to MAP are transmitted frequently, whereas there
is no need to send those messages to the MN’s HAAs as long as the MN is located in the
same MAP domain.
Furthermore, FMIPv6 creates a tunnel between an MN’s previous AR (PAR) and new
AR (NAR). This tunnel is used to transmit MNs’ messages from PAR to NAR during the
handover time, and it is disconnected after the MN fully moves to the new subnet. When
the MN detects its link-layer movement to a new subnet, it sends a router solicitation
proxy message to its PAR asking for the identification of the new subnet, and then sends
a fast BU message to its PAR, after creating a new CoA (NCoA) based on the new subnet
identification. The PAR sends a handover initiate (HI) message to the NAR in order to
create a tunnel between PAR and NAR. To reply to the HI message, the NAR first carries
a DAD mechanism for the NCoA to guarantee its uniqueness.
2.2.2 Proxy Mobile IPv6
Proxy Mobile IPv6 (PMIPv6) [3] is a network-based mobility management protocol, in
which the network itself manages the MN’s mobility. The PMIPv6 is also a localized
protocol, because the MN moves within the local mobility domain (LMD) without changing
its IP address. The LMD contains one or more Local Mobility Anchors (LMAs) that work
as an MNs’ home agents, and a group of Mobile Access Gateways (MAGs) that send the
mobility signals to LMAs on behalf of MNs. When the MN enters the LMD, it sends a
Router Solicitation (RS) to its directly attached MAG, which in turn sends a proxy binding
update (PBU) message to the LMA. After authorizing the MN, the LMA creates a tunnel
with the MAG and sends a Proxy Binding Acknowledgement (PBA) message containing the
MN’s Network Prefix(es) (NPs) to the MAG, which in turn forwards the PBA to the MN
by sending a router advertisement message. Using the NPs, the MN creates its IP address,
and then uses a DAD scheme to guarantee the uniqueness of its configured IP address.
Therefore, the MN can move among different MAGs inside the LMD using its configured
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address and without detecting its movements, which are detected by the attached MAGs



















Figure 2.4: Proxy Mobile IPv6 [3]
2.2.3 Network Mobility
The NEMO basic support (NEMO BS) protocol [53] is the standard protocol to manage
mobility in the entire moving network. As an extension of the mobile IP protocol [54,55],
NEMO BS employs mobile IP’s basic functionalities, such as the home binding updates;
however, these functionalities are performed by the Mobile Router (MR) rather than the
Mobile Network Nodes (MNNs), which only implement the basic IP protocol without being
aware of the entire network mobility.
Initially, to create its network, the MR announces its responsibility for managing the
mobility of the entire network by periodically broadcasting its Mobile Network Prefixes
(MNPs), acquired from the MR’s home network. To join the network, each MNN selects
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a distinct MNP to be its address in the moving network. When moving out from its home
network, the MR acquires a new Care of Address (CoA) from the Foreign Agent (FA),
located in the foreign network, and sends home binding update messages to its Home
Agent (HA) to bind its Home Address (HoA) with its new CoA. Two modes for the binding
update messages are defined: explicit and implicit. The former attaches the MR’s MNPs
to the transmitted binding update messages, while the latter does not attach them because
a dynamic routing protocol is running, between the MR and its HA, which facilitates the
HA’s ability to identify the MR’s MNPs. Accordingly, the whole network’s movement is
controlled by this MR. The HA stores a binding cache and an extra prefix table to store the
MR’s HoA with CoA and MNPs, respectively. Finally, a tunnel between MR’s CoA and
HA is created; therefore, messages transmitted between MNNs and Correspondent Nodes
(CNs) are sent first to the HA, as illustrated in Figure 2.5.
Supporting the MNNs with the required mobility, NEMO BS has some benefits over
the MIP protocol, such as reducing signaling overhead and mobility costs. NEMO BS
is designed to support a single-hop mobile network, in which a direct communication
between an MR and the Internet access router is formed. Therefore, to support Vehicle-
to-Vehicle-to-Infrastructure (V2V2I), in which the vehicle communicates with the RSU
through multi-hop access, the integration of NEMO with VANET, namely NEMO-based
VANET, has two roles: 1) supporting session continuity and global Internet access via
NEMO BS, and 2) supporting multi-hop communication via V2V2I routing schemes such
as georouting [56,57].
To integrate NEMO BS with VANET, two approaches have been defined [58, 59]:
MANET-centric and NEMO-centric. In the MANET-centric approach, V2V2I multi-hop
communications are supported by implementing a NEMO BS protocol that is run on top
of a MANET routing protocol. The advantage of this approach is the separation of the
MANET routing from the NEMO BS, as depicted in the protocol stack shown in Figure
2.6. On the other hand, the NEMO-centric approach supports multi-hop communications
by implementing at least one NEMO mobile routing scheme in the vehicles that form the
V2V2I path between the MR in the mobile network and the infrastructure. In addition to
working as an MR, each OBU, in the intermediate V2V2I communication path, works also
as a relay for the MNNs. MANET routing protocols can be used in the NEMO-centric
approach to optimize the routing paths resulting from the NEMO BS protocol. Figure 2.7
shows the protocol stack for the NEMO-centric approach, which is more appropriate for
nested NEMO and hierarchical structured networks, whereas the MANET-centric approach
is more suitable for our scenario, wherein the ad-hoc structure is implemented in multi-hop
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Figure 2.5: NEMO-based VANET.
Table 2.1: MANET-Centric and NEMO-Centric Comparison.
MANET-Centric NEMO-Centric
Less mobility cost high cost
Simple V2V2I implementation Complex implementation
Self MNP delegation of OBU/MR Hierarchical MNP delegation
Less signaling overhead High signaling
Ad-hoc domain Infrastructure domain
Georouting protocols can be Hierarchical topology can















































































Figure 2.7: NEMO-Centric approach.
2.2.4 Securing IP Mobility for VANETs
MIPV6 protocol defines both the IPSec protocol and the return routability procedure to
protect the MN’s communications to the HA and CNs, respectively. The IPSec protocol
is an internet protocol which was implemented originally to support wired network with
confidentiality and authentication security services. With the introduction of mobility, the
Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) has updated the IPSec to support the Internet mo-
bility protocols [60]. The IPSec protocol consists of two protocols: Encapsulating Security
Payload (ESP) protocol, and Authentication Header (AH) protocol. Moreover, the IPSec
is implemented in two different modes: the transport mode and the tunnel mode. The
IPSec protocol is used by the mobile IPv6 protocol to secure the signalling data transmit-
ted between the mobile node and the home agent. Due to its static policy configuratons,
the IPSec protocol alone cannot support the mobile IPv6 protocol with the required se-
curity mechanisms. However, the mobile IPv6 protocol requires changing the policy as a
consequence of the mobility feature. Therefore, the return routability procedure is added
in order to achieve both security and privacy of the mobile node.
The goals of the return routability procedure are to authenticate the mobile node to the
correspondent node and to construct a shared key between them. As depicted in Figure 2.8,
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this procedure consists of four transmitted messages transferred between the two parties,
namely an MN and CN.
1. Home Test Init (HoTI) Message: This message is sent by the roaming mobile node
to the correspondent node through the home agent using the IP tunneling (1a in
the figure). It contains a random number generated by the mobile node called home
init cookie. It is protected using the IPSec ESP protocol in the tunnel mode. The
inner source address of this message is the mobile node’s home address, the inner
destination address is the correspondent-node’s address, the outer source address is
the mobile node’s care of address, and the outer destination address is the home
agent’s address.
2. Care of-Test Init (CoTI) Message: This message is sent by the mobile node directly
to the correspondent node and it contains another random number called care-of Init
Cookie (1b in the figure). It does not contain any security mechanism to protect the
transmitted data.
3. Home Test Message: This message is sent by the correspondent node to the mobile
node, through the mobile node’s home agent, using IP tunneling (2a in the figure).
The inner source address of this message is the correspondent node’s address, the
inner destination address is the mobile node’s home address, the outer source address
is the mobile node’s home agent, and the outer destination address is the mobile
node’s CoA. It contains three values used to construct a secret key between the
mobile node and the correspondent node. The first value, the home init cookie, is
the same random value, which the mobile node sends in the home test init message.
The second value, the home keygen token, is a secret value generated using the
HMAC-SHA1 algorithm as follows:
Homekeygentoken = First(64, HMAC − SHA1(Kcn, (HoA|nonce|0))) (2.1)
Where Kcn is a 20-octet secret key and nonce is 64-bit secret value. Both Kcn and
the nonce are known only by the correspondent node. The home keygen token is
the first 64 bits of the HMAC-SHA1 function, which takes the concatenation of the
mobile node’s home address (HoA), the secret nonce, and a zero-octet as inputs and
uses the Kcn as the secret key of the function. The third value, the home nonce
index, is sent instead of sending the nonce itself as it is a secret value and cannot be
sent to the mobile node.
4. Care of test (CoT) message: This message is sent by the correspondent node directly
to the mobile node without going through the home agent (2a in the figure). The
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source address of this message is the correspondent node’s address and the destination
address is the mobile node’s CoA. It contains three different values: care of init cookie,
care of keygen token, and care of nonce index. The care of init cookie is the same
value which the mobile node sends to the correspondent node in the care of test init
message. The care of keygen token is another secret value generated as follows:
Careofkeygentoken = First(64, HMAC − SHA1(KCN , (CoA|nonce|1))) (2.2)
The care of keygen token value is generated similarly to the home keygen token
generation, except that the care of address is used instead of the home address and
one-octet is appended instead of zero-octet.
Using both the home keygen and the care of keygen tokens, the MN and the CN
construct a temporary shared key, called a binding management key, Kbm. This shared
key is used to secure the binding update messages transmitted between the MN and the
correspondent node. The binding management key is constructed as follows:
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Figure 2.8: Return Routability Procedure
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Securing PMIPv6
In the PMIPv6 protocol, the IPSec secures the communication between the LMA and
MAGs, however, there are no standard security schemes defined for the communications
between an MN and MAGs. To authenticate an MN that roams to the PMIPv6 domain,
the Internet Authentication, Authorization, and Accounting (AAA) servers are used with
the help of the LMA and MAGs that forward the MN’s credentials to the AAA servers.
However, due to the large delay, this method of communications between MN and AAA
is not suitable for such a localized mobility protocol , PMIPv6, whose goal is to decrease
the transmission delay in seamless communications. In [61], a localized authentication and
billing scheme that is based on the hash-chain value is proposed to locally authenticate the
roaming MN in PMIPv6 domain. The seed of the hash-chain is created by a key agreement
scheme, between the MN and the AAA server, which delegates the authentication to the
LMA in order to create the hash-chain for the MN. Having a dual goal, the employment of
a hash-chain decreases the communication distance between the MAGs and AAA, as well
as creats an electronic currency to be used by the MNs.
Securing NEMO BS
Among the mobility management protocols, the NEMO BS protocol is more suitable for
VANET’s ITS applications. Therefore, many security considerations have been proposed
to protect users when the NEMO protocol is employed. Using the AAA servers deployed
in each subnet along the Internet, and the Foreign AAA (FAAA) server, the scheme in [62]
employs the PANA protocol [63] to authenticate the MR to its Home AAA (HAAA) when
roaming to a visited network. This authentication scheme is implemented before the MR
sends the BU message to its HA, hence, it requires 300s to perform the authentication,
which is not suitable for the seamless communications in ITSs. Therefore, in [64], the MR
can be authenticated by the FAAA server rather than the HAAA server to decrease the
authentication time. A cost function is calculated to decide whether to use FAAA or the
HAAA. In addition, the LMAM scheme [65] is an authentication scheme proposed for the
MR in VANETs to locally authenticate itself to the FAAA. In this scheme, the FAAA
server authenticates the MR by this MR’s MAC address and without referring to the MR’s
HAAA. Due to the need for storing all MRs’ MAC addresses, this scheme can only be used
in small networks, and it does not work for Internet-based VANET’s applications.
Although it is not standardized yet, the NEMO route optimization security has been
greatly discussed. In [66], a route optimization scheme that is based on certificated nodes
has been proposed to be employed in NEMO-based networks. In the proposed scheme,
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public-key certificates are used by the MRs and correspondent routers (CRs) to mutually
authenticate each other as well as authenticate the MNPs. Assuming a pre-assigned public
key infrastructure (PKI), the proposed scheme uses a trusted third party to construct the
PKs and the certificates for all uses.
Furthermore, in [67], a new secure NEMO route optimization, called SeNERO, has been
proposed to overcome the high latency problem that is found in traditional route optimiza-
tion schemes. Under the assumption of the ease of construction of a PKI in aeronautical
systems, SeNERO constructs a mutual authentication as well as a direct path between an
MR and a CR. It is assumed that there is a hierarchical certificate authority system, in
which every router, including MR and CR, uses to prove its authenticity. The MR attaches
to its outgoing messages a certificate chain, which includes the MR’s certificates starting
from it and ending at the trusted root Certificate Authority (CA). SeNERO achieves two
levels of authentications, initial and subsequent authentications. In the initial authentica-
tion, both the MR and CR share a secret key , Ks, which is constructed by CR on the MR’s
demand. Afterwards, both MR and CR exchange their certificate path protected by the
Kc and their signatures to prove their authenticity and their ownership for the MNPs. In
the subsequent authentication, which is performed after an MR’s handover occurs, the CR
creates a new Ks for the roaming MR and uses the key to protect the transmitted BU and
BA messages. Unlike the initial authentication, both certificate and signature operations
are not performed in subsequent authentication.
Although it seems to achieve a high level of security by using public key operations,
SeNERO suffers from a security problem: transmitting the shared key in clear form without
encrypting it. The attacker can easily eavesdrop the transmitted key and break the system.
Moreover, the scheme is based on a certificate chain that relates the MR to the root CA
without considering the mobility feature of the MR. When the MR moves to a new network,
the certificate chain needs to be changed to adapt to the MR’s new location. In addition,
due to using digital signature, SeNERO faces a problem of large handover delays, in which
the delays reach 100s for each authentication level.
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Chapter 3
ALPP: Anonymous and Location




A mobile node’s anonymity and location privacy is among the security challenges that
occur in MIPv6-based mobile networks. The contributions of this chapter are twofold.
First, based on the onion routing [68] and anonymizer [69], we propose an anonymous
and location privacy preserving (ALPP) scheme that consists of two complementary sub-
schemes: anonymous home binding update (AHBU) and anonymous return routability
(ARR). Those sub-schemes efficiently add anonymity and location privacy services to mo-
bile IPv6 home binding update and return routability control messages, respectively, to
achieve mobile senders’ and receivers’ privacy. In other words, AHBU is used to send
anonymous home binding update messages to the MN’s HA, while ARR is used to send
anonymous return routability messages to the MN’s CN. Using the onion routing, we re-
peatedly encrypt the transmitted messages at each hop to protect them from traffic analysis
adversaries. In addition, we adapt the traditional anonymizer, which is a fixed proxy used
to hide the MN’s location, by changing this anonymizer at each time the MN roams to
a foreign network. Our adaptation for the anonymizer solves the single point of failure
problem that occurs with the traditional anonymizer. Second, based on the certificate-less
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public key cryptography [70], we propose anonymous authentication and key establishment
schemes to work in conjunction with the ALPP scheme. The authentication scheme is used
to authenticate an MN to its FG while preserving the MN’s anonymity. The challenge of
proposing such a scheme is the difficulty of constructing a mutual trust between arbitrary
nodes, which have not met each other before. The key establishment scheme is used to
generate a shared key between an MN and its FG. Using the certificate-less public key
cryptography helps in decreasing the computation overhead of the proposed schemes.
Unlike existing anonymity and location privacy preserving schemes, the ALPP scheme
alleviates the trade-off between the network performance and the achieved privacy level.
We show that AHBU and ARR sub-schemes achieve a high level of location privacy, where
no entity in the network can reveal an MN’s locations except the MN itself. Moreover,
using the entropy model, we show that our proposed scheme achieves a higher degree of
anonymity than that achieved by the mix-based scheme with one mix server. Additionally,
extensive simulation results demonstrate that our sub-schemes have low routing delays and
can thus be used during time-restricted seamless communications for mobile networks.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 recalls the certificate-
less public key cryptography. Section 3.3 reviews the related work. The system models
are presented in Section 3.4. The proposed scheme, ALPP, is presented in Section 3.5.
The privacy and security analysis are given in Section 3.6, while Section 3.7 presents the
performance evaluation and simulation results. Finally, the chapter summary is given in
Section 3.8.
3.2 Preliminaries
3.2.1 CERTIFICATE-LESS PUBLIC KEY CRYPTOGRAPHY
A trusted key generator center (KGC) uses a security parameter, K, and runs a setup
algorithm to produce two keys, (s, Param). The master key, s, is selected randomly from
Z∗q, and is kept secret at the KGC. The public Param = 〈G1,G2, e, n, P, P0, H1, H2〉 is
transmitted to all network’s users. G1 and G2 are cyclic groups of a large prime order, q,
ê : G1×G1 → G2 is a bilinear pairing function on elliptic curves [71], n is the bit-length of
the plaintext, P is G1’s generator, P0 = s×P , and H1 : {0, 1}∗ → G∗1 and H2 : G2 → {0, 1}n
are two hashing functions.
Upon receiving a request from a user A with identity IDA, the KGC creates A’s partial
private key, DA = s×QA, where QA = H1(IDA). The KGC securely transmits the partial
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private key, DA to A . The DA is used by A to create its public-private key pair, (PA, SA),
as follows:
xA ∈R Z∗q
SA = xA ×DA
XA = xA × P
YA = xA × P0 = xA × s× P
PA = 〈XA, YA〉
(3.1)
This cryptography is called certificate-less public key cryptography (CL-PKC) [70] be-
cause unlike traditional public key infrastructure, a user A does not need a certificate from
a trusted certificate authority. Therefore, the CL-PKC saves the computation overheads
needed for certificate distribution and verification. Algorithm 1 presents the certificate-less
encryption of a message m that is transmitted to a user A. Notice that the sender uses
only A’s identity (IDA) and public key (PA) to produce a ciphertext, c. In Section 3.6.2,
we prove that if either A’s identity or public key is changed by an adversary, then the
encryption operation will result a failure operation (⊥) or an incorrect ciphertext. More-
over, to decrypt this ciphertext, c = 〈u, v〉, A performs only one pairing function to get
the message, m = v ⊕H2(ê(SA, u)).
Algorithm 1: CL-PK Encryption
Input: m, IDA,and PA
Output: Ciphertext c
if ê(XA, P0) 6= ê(YA, P ) then1
c =⊥2
else3
QA = H1(IDA) ∈ G∗14
r ∈R Z∗q5
c = 〈rP,m⊕H2(ê(QA, YA)r)〉6
end7
In this chapter, we used CL-PKC to generate a shared key between two users, A and
B. A sends its public key along with a random value TA to B, which in turn replies with
its public key PB and another random number, TB. TA = aP and TB = bP , where a and
b are randomly chosen by A and B respectively. Using this transmitted information, both
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A and B create two keys: KA is generated by A, and KB is generated by B, as follows:
KA = ê(QB, YB)
a.ê(SA, TB) (3.2)
KB = ê(QA, YA)
b.ê(SB, TA) (3.3)
Using the pairing function’s properties, it can be showed that both keys are identical
as follows:
KA = ê(QB, YB)
a.ê(SA, TB)
= ê(QB, xBsP )
a.ê(xAsQA, bP )
= ê(xBsQB, aP ).ê(QA, xAsP )
b





Previous anonymity and location privacy schemes in mobile IPv6 networks are based on
Chaum’s mix [72] which introduces the idea of the mix-network. A mix-network is a group
of servers, called mix servers, that decrypt incoming messages and then retransmit them
to the destinations in a different order rather than their incoming order. The goal of this
mixing is to hide the sender’s identity and locations. The idea of mix-network is employed
in schemes called cascaded overlay mix-network-based location privacy schemes [68,73,74].
Another Chaum’s mix-based scheme, called anonymizer, is proposed in [69], which is based
on a single trusted proxy that is used to hide user’s identity and location information from
a CN.
Based on the anonymizer [69], a scheme with eight different levels of anonymity and
location privacy is proposed in [75]. This scheme introduces a new entity, called Information
Translating Proxy (ITP), which works as an anonymizer in a mobile IPv6 network. Each
mobile node shares a secret key with the ITP, and uses this key to encrypt the home
binding update messages at the time of roaming. Instead of sending the binding update
messages directly to the mobile node’s home agent, the mobile node sends them to the ITP
which removes the mobile node’s identity information and then forwards these messages to
the home agent. Although it presents a practical solution for location privacy, this scheme
is susceptible to a single point of failure, because it uses a single trusted anonymizer for
all mobile nodes. In our proposed scheme, ALPP, we use the idea of anonymizer, solving
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the single point of failure problem by changing the anonymizer as the MN moves among
visited networks.
In [76], an anonymity scheme is introduced which is based on generating groups of
pseudonyms and sharing them between the communicating parties. However, this scheme
requires a precise synchronization, in such a way that both the sender and the receiver
must use the same pseudonym at the same time. In the case of weak synchronization,
a collision at the receiver side may happen. Furthermore, a pseudo HoA is randomly
generated in [77] to replace the real HoA. Although this pseudo identity achieves the MN’s
privacy, it may cause a repudiation attack if the MN is a malicious one. A privacy tag is
introduced in [78] to hide the MN’s HoA from the correspondent node during transmitting
the binding update messages from MN to its CN. This privacy tag is a function of the
MN’s HoA and it prevents the CN from knowing about the MN’s roaming.
Because the mobile IP address represents both an MN’s identity and location, mobile
IP-based networks have location privacy problems. Therefore, in [12], a virtual ID is
used to represent MN’s identity and hence separate this identity from MN’s location.
Therefore, extra servers are needed to map virtual IDs to MNs’ current locations. However,
this scheme causes a triangle routing problem, because messages sent from the CN are
transmitted to the MN’s HA before reaching the intended MN. In [79], a name space is
used to represent the MN’s identity and a new layer, Host Identity Protocol (HIP), is
added to the TCP/IP protocol stack. Supporting mobility and multi-homing is the main
goal for the HIP, additionally it provides MN’s location privacy service. We argue that
HIP protocol is computationally expensive. To initiate a communication between two
entities, initiator and responder, HIP uses the entities’ public keys for both identification
and sharing a secret key between these entities. In addition, the responder transmits a
puzzle to the initiator in order to authenticate it, which takes CPU processing time from
the initiator to solve the puzzle. By definition, the client puzzle is a difficult problem that
requires amount of computations and/or storage to be solved at client side. Therefore, the
HIP protocol cannot be used with seamless communications.
Furthermore, a mix-based location privacy scheme is proposed in [33] to achieve anonymity
and location privacy for mobile IPv6 binding update control messages. A network of mix
servers controlled by a mix center is deployed, and uses (k, n) ElGamal threshold mech-
anism to decrypt the binding update messages received from the roaming mobile node.
This scheme uses the mix-network [72] to hide the MN’s location and a pseudo identity
to hide the MN’s real identity. However, the mix center identifies the mobile node’s home
address, care of address, home agent, and foreign gateway. Therefore, the mix center
can easily violate the mobile node’s privacy. Unlike our proposed scheme, the mix-based
scheme cannot be used for the time-restricted seamless communications, because it has
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high routing-delays, especially with a large number of mix servers.
In [34], the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) group defines the location privacy
problem in the mobile IPv6 networks. The problem definition is divided into two main
parts: disclosing the care of address to the correspondent node, and revealing the home ad-
dress to an eavesdropper. Furthermore, the IETF group published experimental solutions
in [35] to solve only the second part of the problem. Those solutions do not address the first
part of the location privacy problem, i.e., unveiling the CoA to the correspondent node.
Specifically, two schemes are proposed in [35]. The first scheme uses the encrypted home
address (EHoA) to conceal the home address from the adversary, while the second uses
pseudo identity (PHoA) to hide the home address from the correspondent node. How-
ever, EHoA and PHoA schemes achieve only the mobile node’s anonymity, and assume
that MN’s location privacy is implicitly achieved. In our proposed scheme, in addition
to the problems defined in [34], we solve two more privacy problems: disclosing the CoA
to the HA, and revealing the HoA to the FG. In Section 3.6, we show that our proposed
sub-schemes, AHBU and ARR, achieve higher anonymity and location privacy levels than
those achieved by EHoA and PHoA schemes.
3.4 SYSTEM MODELS
3.4.1 Network Model
Our network model, as shown in Figure 3.1, consists of a group of heterogeneous networks,
such as VANETs with IEEE 802.11p, WiMaX, and WiFi as heterogeneous access networks,
that use the mobile IPv6 protocol as a mobility management protocol. The mobile IPv6
protocol supports the mobile users with mobility services; therefore, mobile users can
receive their communication messages while they are roaming to foreign networks. Each
network of these heterogeneous networks consists of a number of MNs, such as vehicles, and
a set of gateways, such as the Road side units (RSUs) inside VANETs. Each gateway has
three functions: 1) to work as a HA for MNs that are originally located in its network; 2)
to work as a foreign gateway (FG) for the visitor MNs; and 3) to work as an intermediate
foreign gateway (IFG) for MNs that are neither visitors nor originally located in this
gateway’s network. Each MN defines its HA, located in its home network, and its FG,
located in its current visited network. Moreover, the MN also defines a list of all IFGs,
which consists of all gateways that are located in all networks except gateways that are











IFG: Intermediate Foreign Gateway
Figure 3.1: MIPv6 network model.
Using the IPsec Internet key-exchange protocol [80], each MN maintains a secret key,
KMN−HA, that is shared permanently between the MN and its HA. When roaming to
a foreign network, the MN sends mobile IPv6 binding update control messages to both
its home agent and its CN to inform them about MN’s current location. Therefore, any
subsequent data messages can be directed to the MN’s current location (MN’s CoA) instead
of sending them to its home address. Originally, the roaming MN sends home binding
update messages to its HA, and it sends return routability messages to its CN. In our
model, we add anonymity and location privacy to these control messages in order to ensure
senders’ and receivers’ privacy. Therefore, the roaming MN sends anonymous home binding
update and anonymous return routability messages instead. Figure 3.2 depicts the control
messages that will be used in our proposed scheme. Note that the original BU and BA
messages use ESP protocol in transport mode; however, in our case we use ESP protocol
in tunnel mode.
3.4.2 Threat and Trust Models
Two kinds of adversaries are defined: external and internal. The external adversary is
a passive traffic analysis attacker, analyzing the transmitted packets to deduce useful in-
formation about the identities and the locations of the senders. The external adversary
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Figure 3.2: Mobile IPv6 control messages.
packets at each hop, and tracks the packet to know its destination.
The internal adversary is a network entity that intentionally observes MNs’ identities
and locations. In our model, we consider the HAs, FGs, and CNs entities as internal
adversaries. These entities may misuse the observed MNs’ privacy information and take
malicious actions toward these MNs. Therefore, HAs, FGs, and CNs are prevented from
learning MNs’ private information. However, these entities need to learn an MN’s locations
because they help in the MN’s mobility management process. To illustrate this contra-
diction, consider for instance a home binding update message that is sent from an MN
to its HA. The receiver HA needs to know the MN’s identity and current location, and
stores this information in the HA’s binding cache. Therefore, the HA can forward any
subsequent messages destined for the MN’s HoA to the current MN’s CoA. However, at
the same time the HA may maliciously use the MN’s information to violate MN’s location
privacy. To solve this contradiction, we let the internal adversaries learn only part of the
mobile nodes’ private information. This part is adequate to perform the MN’s mobility
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management process without violating MN’s privacy. HAs and CNs are allowed to know
mobile nodes’ HoAs, however they are unable to learn MNs’ care of addresses and foreign
gateways. Moreover, the foreign gateway is allowed to know the mobile node’s CoAs, and
it should not know the MNs’ home addresses. All in all, each internal adversary learns
a different part of MN’s privacy information. Therefore, internal adversaries may collude
with each other to know the whole MN’s private information.
We propose a revocable privacy scheme in which one entity, the HA, can reveal the MNs
privacy at the time of dispute when the MN repudiates the service. Therefore, we consider
the HA as a non-colluder with other entities in the network. Moreover, we consider all
other entities, including the FGs, IFGs, and CNs, to be untrusted entities, and they may
collude with each other to reveal the mobile node’s private information. In addition, there
is a trusted third party that generates a group key (Kgroup) for the entire networks. The
created Kgroup is securely distributed in some way to all legitimate users in the system.
3.5 Anonymous and Location Privacy Preserving (ALPP)
Scheme
In this section, we propose the anonymous and location privacy preserving scheme (ALPP),
which is used by an MN when roaming from its home network to another foreign network.
This time period is called seamless handover time, where the MN needs to continue its
connectivity while roaming across heterogeneous networks. To preserve MN’s anonymity
and location privacy in this time-restricted seamless handover, ALPP performs three stages:
the setup, AHBU, and ARR. We consider AHBU and ARR as two sub-schemes, because
any one of them can be independently implemented in the network.
3.5.1 Setup
This stage takes place when an MN roams to a foreign network and comes under an FG’s
coverage. Based on CL-PKC, this FG works as a KGC for the CL-PKC and periodically
transmits its identity and its public Param = 〈G1,G2, ê, n, P, P0, H1, H2〉 to the network’s
users. The goal of the setup stage is twofold: 1) to mutually authenticate the MN and FG
while keeping MN’s anonymity; and 2) to establish a shared secret key between those two
nodes. The exchanged messages shown in Figure 3.3 illustrates the mutual authentication
as well as the key establishment schemes.
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The challenge of the mutual authentication scheme is the difficulty to establish a trust
between two arbitrary nodes, MN and FG, which have not met each other before. The fol-
lowing steps summarize the setup stage, where the first three steps achieve the anonymous
mutual authentication scheme, and the last step achieves the key establishment scheme.
FGMN
PIDMN= CoA || ti
  Enc(Kgroup, PIDMN)
  Enc(PIDMN,(DMN||PIDMN, Sign(xFG,DMN||PIDMN)))
IF e(DMN,P) ≠ e(QMN,P0)
  PIDMN, PMN = (XMN, YMN), TMN = aP
IF e(XMN,P0) ≠ e(YMN,P)
  IDFG, PFG = (XFG, YFG), TFG = bP
IF e(XFG,P0) ≠ e(YFG,P)
KMN-FG = e(QFG, YFG)
a
. e(xMN,TFG) KMN-FG = e(QMN, YMN)
b
. e(xFG,TMN)
Figure 3.3: Setup stage.
1. The roaming MN creates a pseudo identity, PIDMN , by concatenating its acquired
CoA and a time stamp, i. e., PIDMN = CoA‖ti. Furthermore, the MN encrypts the
PIDMN using the group key, Kgroup, and sends the encrypted message to the FG as
follows:
FG←MN : Enc(Kgroup, P IDMN)
By sending this message, the FG guarantees that the MN is a legitimate user. Recall
that Kgroup is a secret key shared among all users in the system. The source address
of this message is PIDMN and the destination address is the FG’s address.
2. After authenticating the MN as a legitimate user, the FG creates the MN’s partial
private key, DMN = s × QMN , where s and QMN are defined in Section 3.2.1.
Furthermore, the FG signs the DMN along with the PIDMN and then sends them to
the MN after encrypting the whole message using the mobile node’s pseudo identity,
PIDMN , as follows:
Enc(PIDMN , (DMN‖PIDMN , Sign(SFG, DMN‖PIDMN)) (3.5)
35
Note that the MN creates different PIDMN at each foreign network. The PIDMN
involves the CoA, which is related to the FG. Therefore, when the MN communicates
with a different FG, its CoA changes and accordingly the PIDMN will be changed.
This property increases the MN’s anonymity level.
3. The MN verifies the FG’s signature in the received message and then checks the
correctness of the received partial private key, DMN , using the following condition:
IF ê(DMN , P ) 6= ê(QMN , P0), wrongDMN
After successful verification, the MN generates its public and private keys, PMN
and SMN , using the received partial private key, DMN . When the MN changes its
PIDMN , the computed public-private key pair will be changed accordingly.
4. The roaming MN uses the generated public-private key pair to generate a secret key
KMN−FG shared with its FG as illustrated in Algorithm 2:
Algorithm 2: MN-FG shared key establishment
Input: PIDMN , PMN , PFG
Output: Shared secret key, KMN−FG
FG←MN : PIDMN , PMN = (XMN , YMN), TMN = aP1




PFG = (XFG, YFG), TFG = bP6
if ê(XFG, P0) 6= ê(YFG, P ) then7
Return illegal FG8
else9
at MN: KMN−FG = ê(QFG, YFG)
a.ê(SMN , TFG)10




Note that in the above steps, both MN and FG authenticate each other. The foreign
gateway authenticates the mobile node by both the group key, Kgroup, and the pairing
function, ê. In addition, the mobile node authenticates the foreign gateway by verifying
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FG’s signature, and checking the correctness of the partial private key that is created by
this foreign gateway.
3.5.2 Anonymous Home Binding Update Sub-Scheme
The goal of the anonymous home binding update sub-scheme (AHBU) is to add the
anonymity and location privacy services to the home binding update control messages.
The AHBU sub-scheme involves two main stages: the binding update, and the binding
acknowledgement. In the remainder of the paper, we consider that the mobile node’s HoA
and CoA represent its identity and its current location respectively.
Anonymous Binding Update
In this stage, the roaming MN uses the created shared secret key, KMN−FG, to send
anonymous binding update messages to its home agent, located in this MN’s home network.
As shown in Figure 3.5, the home binding update steps can be summarized as follows:
1. The roaming MN chooses an intermediate foreign gateway, call it home intermediate
foreign gateway (HIFG), from the IFGs list. This HIFG is chosen to be any one of
the gateways that are located on the shortest path between the MN’s current location
and MN home-agent’s address. To choose this HIFG, the MN first asks its attached
FG to broadcast a route request message to request the shortest routing path to
its home agent’s address. After receiving the route reply message that contains the
shortest path, the MN then randomly chooses one gateway from the gateways on the
shortest path to be the HIFG. As illustrated later, the MN uses this HIFG as an
anonymizer to hide its location from its HA.
2. The mobile node creates an updated version of a binding update (BU) message and
encrypts it using the default security protocol, IPsec protocol. The original BU
message contains the mobile node’s home address, HoAMN , and its current location,
CoAMN . However, the updated BU message contains the HoAMN encrypted by the
MN-HA shared secret key, KMN−HA, as well as the following additional fields:
• Source address: Enc(KMN−FG, PIDMN)
• Destination address: FG ’s address
• Enc(PHIFG, HA’s address)
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• HIFG’s address
Note that the source address looks like a wrong IPv6 address format; however, thanks
to the setup stage that enables the FG to identify the CoAMN . According to the the
setup stage, the FG stores a binding between the encrypted address, Enc(KMN−FG,
PIDMN), and COAMN as shown in Table 3.1. Figure 3.4 shows an encrypted BU












(Alternative care of address)
 Encrypted by KMN-HA
 Encrypted by PHIFG
 Encrypted by KMN-FG
Figure 3.4: Encrypted binding update message.
Using the idea of onion routing, the MN then repeatedly encrypts this binding update
message using three different keys: 1) the MN’s shared key with its home agent,
KMN−HA; 2) the HIFG’s public key, PHIFG; and 3) the MN’s shared key with the
foreign gateway, KMN−FG. The MN then sends this encrypted BU message to its
FG.
3. The foreign gateway decrypts the received BU message using its shared key with the
MN, KMN−FG, and then sends the decrypted message to the HIFG after adapting
the following fields:
• Source address: FG’s address
• Destination address: HIFG’s address
• Enc(KMN−FG, PIDMN)
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• Enc(PHIFG ,HA’s address)
4. The HIFG stores a binding between the encrypted care of address, Enc(KMN−FG,
PIDMN), and the FG’s address. Note that PIDMN is a concatenation of MN’s
CoA and a time stamp ti. Therefore, for any subsequent messages destined to the
encrypted PIDMN , the HIFG forwards them to the FG instead. The HIFG also
decrypts the encrypted home agent, Enc(PHIFG ,HA’s address), to identify the HA’s
address and then forwards the BU message to this HA. When the home agent receives
the BU message, it contains the following fields:
• Source address: HIFG’s address
• Destination address: HA address
• Encrypted CoA, Enc(KMN−FG, PIDMN).
• HoA destination option (HoAD): Enc(KMN−HA, HoAMN)
5. The home agent can identify the intended MN from the received HoAD, Enc(KMN−HA,
HoAMN). This is because we consider that each HA stores the HoAs of MNs that
are under its coverage as well as HoADs. Afterwards, the HA stores a binding be-
tween this MN’s home address and the encrypted CoA that represents MN’s current
location. In this binding, the HA cannot identify the MN’s current location because
it is an encrypted version of the MN’s CoA, Enc(KMN−FG, CoAMN ||ti). Therefore,
the HA stores the HIFG’s address as a proxy to reach this encrypted address. Con-
sequently, the HA forwards any subsequent messages destined for the roaming MN
or to the encrypted CoA to this HIFG’s address.
Anonymous Home Binding Acknowledgement
After receiving a BU message, the MN’s home agent replies by a binding acknowledgment
message that is transmitted to the MN. The goal of this message is to inform the MN
that the HA creates a binging between the MN’s home address and MN’s current location.
Therefore, the home binding acknowledgement messages complete the mobility manage-
ment process. As shown in Figure 3.5, the steps to perform anonymous home binding
acknowledgement are as follows:
1. The home agent creates a home binding Acknowledgement (HBA) message, en-




Enc(KMN-FG , Enc(PHIFG , Enc(KMN-HA , HBU)))
 Enc(PHIFG , Enc(KMN-HA , HBU))
HA
  Enc(PFG , HBA)
  Enc(KMN-FG , HBA)
  Enc(KMN-HA , HBU)
  Enc(PHIFG , HBA)
Figure 3.5: Anonymous home binding update scheme.
• Source address: HA’s address
• Destination address: HIFG’s address
• Enc(KMN−FG, PIDMN)
2. When receiving the HBA message, the HIFG checks its cache memory to identify
the corresponding proxy that is attached with the encrypted address, Enc(KMN−FG,
PIDMN). This proxy is the MN’s FG; therefore, the HIFG sends the HBA to that
FG after encrypting it using the FG’s public key and adapting the following fields:
• Source address: HIFG’s address
• Destination address: FG’s address
• Enc(KMN−FG, PIDMN)
3. The foreign gateway decrypts the received Enc(KMN−FG, PIDMN) and then forwards
the HBA message to the intended mobile node’s care of address.
Table 3.1 shows a summary of stored bindings at each network entity.
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Table 3.1: Network Bindings
Entity Binding(s)
FG PIDMN → CoAMN ,
Enc(KMN−FG, P IDMN )→ CoAMN
HIFG/CIFG Enc(KMN−FG, P IDMN )→ FG’s address
HA HoAMN → Enc(KMN−FG, P IDMN ),
Enc(KMN−FG, P IDMN )→ HIFG’s address
CN HoAMN → Enc(KMN−FG, P IDMN ),
Enc(KMN−FG, P IDMN )→ CIFG’s address
3.5.3 Anonymous Return Routability Sub-Scheme
In mobile IPv4 networking, a roaming mobile node communicates with a CN using the
reverse tunneling routing method. In this routing, the MN’s CoA represents its current
location and the CN doesn’t identify this location. Therefore, instead of sending messages
directly to the MN’s CoA, the CN transmits these messages to the MN’s HA, which even-
tually forwards the messages to the the MN’s CoA. This indirectness in routing achieves
mobile node’s location privacy since the CN doesn’t realize the mobile node’s movement.
However, the reverse tunneling increases the communication routing delay, and it may
lead to a triangle routing problem. The worst case of the triangle routing problem occurs
when both MN and CN are roaming to the same foreign network. In this case, the CN
sends the messages to the MN’s HA in home network, which in turn forwards the messages
again to the same foreign network. This reverse tunneling routing cannot be used with the
seamless communications because it increases the handover time and eventually causes a
service interruption.
To solve the triangle routing problem, the mobile IPv6 introduces the route optimization
routing method. In this routing, the CN identifies the MN’s CoA; Therefore, the CN uses
the shortest routing path to send messages to the roaming MN. This path is created using
the return routability procedure, which is a group of four messages that is exchanged
between the mobile node and the correspondent node. Home Test Init, Care of Test Init,
Home Test, and Care of Test are the four messages of the return routability procedure.
After successful transmission of these messages, the CN creates a binding between the
MN’s home address and current location, the MN’s CoA, so the CN can directly transmit
any subsequent messages to the MN’s new location. This direct routing method decreases
the routing delay; however, it breaks an MN’s location privacy. By monitoring the return
routability transmitted messages, the CN as well as an eavesdropper can reveal the MN’s
anonymity and location privacy.
In this section, the anonymous return routability (ARR) sub-scheme is proposed to add
anonymity and location privacy services to the return routability procedure. In the Home
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Test Init (HTIM) and Home Test (HTM) messages, the mobile node and the correspondent
node communicate through the mobile node’s home agent (reverse tunneling) to transmit
the home-keygen token. Therefore, the AHBU sub-scheme illustrated in Section 3.5.2 can
be used to add the MN’s privacy for these two messages. HTIM and HTM messages are
transmitted from MN to the HA then to the CN. They are similar to BU/BA message be-
cause they are also transmitted from MN to HA, so we consider HTIM and HTM messages
as BU and BA messages from the transmitted path perspective. Although the messages’
formats are different, we can use the same HIFG to transmit HTIM and HTM from MN to
HA. Moreover, in the Care of Test Init message (CTIM) and Care of Test message (CTM),
the care-of-keygen token is generated through the direct communication between the mo-
bile node and the correspondent node. Therefore, the ARR sub-scheme is proposed to
ensure MN’s and CN’s anonymity and location privacy for both CTIM and CTM messages
transmissions. In the following subsections, two scenarios for the correspondent nodes will
be presented: one for a fixed node, and one for a roaming node. In the former scenario, the
correspondent node may be a fixed node or a mobile node that is located in its home net-
work at the time of communication with an MN. In the latter scenario, the correspondent
node is a mobile node which roams to a foreign network.
Fixed Correspondent Node Scenario
In this scenario, we consider that the MN’s and the fixed-CN’s home addresses are known
to each other, However, to achieve location privacy, the MN’s current location, CoAMN , is
kept unknown to the correspondent node. The ARR sub-scheme consists of two transmitted
messages: Care of Test Init, and Care of Test messages. As shown in Figure 3.6, the CTIM
is transmitted from the MN to the CN. The MN first selects an IFG, which we will call
correspondent IFG, CIFG. The CIFG is chosen from among those on the shortest path
between the MN and CN. The MN then repeatedly encrypts the message using three
different keys: 1) the public key of the CN’s home agent, PHACN ; 2) the CIFG’s public
key, PCIFG; and 3) the MN’s shared key with its foreign gateway, KMN−FG. The MN then
sends the encrypted message to the FG in the foreign network, which in turn forwards the
message to the CIFG, and then the message is forwarded to the CN’s HA. Finally the CN’s
HA forwards the message to the intended CN.
When receiving the care of test message, the CN creates a binding between the MN’s
home address and an encrypted version of the MN’s current address, Enc(KMN−FG,PIDMN).
Furthermore, the CN also stores the address of CIFG as a proxy to reach this encrypted
address, Enc(KMN−FG,PIDMN).
The CN then transmits a CTM message to the MN as an acknowledgement for the
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Care of Test init message. The CN first encrypts the CTM using its shared key with
its HA, KHACN−CN , and transmits the encrypted message to its home agent. The CN’s
home agent then encrypts the message with CIFG’s public key before transmitting it to
the CIFG, which in turn encrypts and transmits the message to the MN’s FG. Finally,
the MN’s FG encrypts the CTM using the shared key with that MN, KMN−FG, and then
transmits the encrypted CTM to the MN.
MN FG CIFG
Enc(KMN-FG , Enc(PCIFG , Enc(PHACN  , CTIM)))
 Enc(PCIFG , Enc(PHACN , CTIM))
  Enc(PFG, CTM)
  Enc(KMN-FG, CTM)
  Enc(PHACN , CTIM)
  Enc(PCIFG, CTM)
CN
HACN
  Enc(KHACN-CN , CTIM)
  Enc(KHACN-CN , CTM)
Figure 3.6: Anonymous return routability, fixed CN.
Mobile Correspondent Node scenario
The mobile CN scenario is more difficult than the fixed CN scenario because in this scenario,
both the MN and the CN move to two foreign networks. The goal of the ARR sub-scheme
here is to achieve MN’s and CN’s location privacy, which requires hiding the two nodes’
current locations from each other. Considering an MN as a mobile sender and a CN as a
mobile receiver, we here achieve anonymity and location privacy for both mobile senders
and mobile receivers.
We consider that both MN’s and CN’s home addresses are known to each other. As a
mobile node, the CN implements the AHBU scheme, introduced in Section 3.5.2, to achieve
its anonymity and location privacy towards its home network. To implement the ARR sub-
scheme, as shown in Figure 3.7, the MN sends a CTIM to the correspondent node. First,
the CTIM message is sent to the CN’s home agent, which discovers that the CN is currently
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MN FGMN CIFGMN
Enc(KMN-FG , Enc(PCIFG , Enc(PHACN  
, CTIM)))
 Enc(PCIFG , Enc(PHACN , CTIM))
  Enc(PCIFGMN, CTM)
  Enc(KMN-FGMN, CTM)
  Enc(PHACN , CTIM)
HACN
 Enc(PCIFGCN, Enc(KHACN-CN , 
CTIM))




 Enc(PFGCN, Enc(KHACN-CN , 
CTIM))
  Enc(KFGCN-CN , CTM)
  Enc(PFGMN, CTM)
Figure 3.7: Anonymous return routability, mobile CN.
roaming on a foreign network. Therefore, the CN’s home agent forwards the message to
the CN’s CIFG, CIFGCN , which in turn transmits the CTIM to the roaming CN.
Going the other way, when the CN sends the CTM to the MN, it is sent directly to the
MN’s CIFG, CIFGMN . The CTM message is not transmitted to the CN’s HA because
CIFGCN already knows the CIFGMN ’s address, and thus does not need to ask CN’s HA
about the CIFGMN ’s address. Therefore, the length of the CTM routing path is shorter
than the length of the CTIM routing path, so the CTM routing path is used for data
transmission between a roaming MN and a CN.
The worst case is when the CN and the MN move to the same foreign network. In
this case, the two nodes select either the same or different FGs. If both nodes choose
the same FG, then only this FG realizes that they are in the same network. Therefore,
the FG delivers the messages between the MN and CN without forwarding them to the
corresponding CIFGs. If the two nodes choose two different FGs in the same foreign
networks, the MN-CN routing path goes through the corresponding CIFGs and this leads
to high routing delay.
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3.6 Privacy and Security Analysis
3.6.1 Privacy Analysis
In our network, the mobile node’s HoA and CoA represent its identity and its current
location respectively. Therefore, violating an MN’s HoA means breaking its anonymity,
and violating an MN’s CoA means breaking its location privacy.
As in [81], we use the entropy model to measure the degree of anonymity for both
our proposed scheme and the mix-based scheme [33]. The degree of anonymity, d, can be
measured by the following equation:






H(X) is the entropy of the network, which measures the amount of information that an
attacker knows about the identity of message’s sender. HM is the maximum entropy of




















where pi is the probability that a node i is the sender of a message, n is the number of
nodes in the home network, and L is the number of networks in the system.









where K is the number of mix servers, L is the number of networks in the system, and m is
the number of messages that are mixed together at each mix server. The number of mixed
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messages is an indicator for the number of senders, because in the mix-based scheme, each
sender sends one message at a time to the mix server. Therefore, m also represents number
of senders in the network.
Figure 3.8 shows the degree of anonymity for our scheme at different values of L and
for the mix-based scheme with one mix server (K = 1). ALPP’s degree of anonymity
increases as the number of nodes in the home network increases, but it decreases as the
number of networks in the system increases. On the other hand, the degree of anonymity
for the mix-based scheme increases as the number of senders increases. For the mix-based
scheme, we fix the number of users in one network to be 1000 users. Therefore, for L = 10,
the total number of users is 10000.





























Figure 3.8: Degree of anonymity.
Compared to our proposed scheme, ALPP, the mix-based scheme with one mix server
achieves a lower level of anonymity when number of senders is below 1000. Increasing the
number of senders in the mix-based scheme causes a high delay, as will be shown later.
Moreover, increasing the number of mix servers leads to increasing the level of anonymity,
but also increases the network delay. This trade-off prevents the mix-based scheme from
being used for seamless communications, which require low routing delay to achieve service
continuity.
To illustrate the impact of delays on the mix-based scheme, Figure 3.9 shows the delay
of the scheme multiplied by the achieved degree of anonymity. Assuming 2ms for the mix
server to send and receive a message, the mix-based scheme with one mix server requires
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around 1.2sec to serve 1000 senders. This delay increases to around 5sec as the number
of mix servers increases. To achieve higher anonymity using one mix server, the number
of senders, m, that send messages to this mix server should be increased. For one mix
server, m ranges from zero to the total number of users in the system (L.n). However,
the network delay increases as m increases, because the mix server needs to wait until
receiving all messages from all senders, then mixes and retransmits them. Alternatively,
the anonymity level can be increased when the number of mix servers, K, increases. In
this case, the number of senders, m, is limited to 0 ≤ m ≤ L.n
K
. However, the network
delay also increases when the number of mix servers increases, because these mix servers
work sequentially with each other. As a conclusion, in the mix-based scheme, there is a
trade-off between the achieved anonymity level and the network delays.







































Figure 3.9: Mix-based delay to degree of anonymity ratio.
On the other hand, Figure 3.10 shows the delay of the ALPP scheme multiplied by its
degree of anonymity. Compared to the mix-based scheme, our scheme has a delay of 1.5ms
to serve 1000 users, which is 99% less than the mix-based scheme’s delay.
The proposed ALPP scheme ensures sender’s and receiver’s location privacy by hiding
their care of addresses from both the home agent and correspondent node. In our network,
the care of address and the foreign gateway represent a node’s location information. The
mobile node’s home agent cannot determine the mobile node’s care of address, because
it receives an encrypted address, Enc(KMN−FG,PIDMN), instead of a plain-text address.
Moreover, the home agent does not communicate directly with the foreign gateway, they
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Figure 3.10: ALPP’s delay to degree of anonymity ratio.
communicate through a proxy, IFG. Therefore, the home agent cannot identify the MN’s
FG.
Table 3.2 shows the mobile node’s information that each entity in the network can
acquire. In the table, the header column represents network entities, the header row
represents MN’s information, K means that the network entity knows the information
part, and U means that the information is unknown to the network entity. As shown in
the table, no network entity except the MN itself can identify this node’s location, CoA.
Two columns in the table represent MN’s location information, the CoA and FG columns.
The CoA column show that no entity knows the MN’s CoA except this MN and its FG.
Although the FG identify the MN’s location, it does not identify this MN because the MN
communicates with the FG by means of a pseudo identity instead of its real identity. In
addition, the FG column shows that the MN, FG, and IFG know MN’s FG. The IFG only
specifies MN’s FG, but it does not identify the MN itself.
3.6.2 Security Analysis
The security of the ALPP scheme is based on the security of the proposed key establishment
scheme that is illustrated in Algorithm 2. Moreover, the security of the key establishment
scheme is based on the hardness of the elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem (ECDLP).
48
Table 3.2: Mobile Node’s Information Knowledge.
HoA CoA HA FG CN IFG
MN K K K K K K
HA K U K U K K
FG U K K K U K
IFG U U K K K K
CN K U K U K K
Adversary U U U U U K
In [82] it is proved that ECDLP can be solved in at least sub-exponential time. ECDLP
is a hard problem since no polynomial time algorithm can solve it.
Definition 1. The Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem (ECDLP):
Given P and xP as two points on elliptic curve E, find x where x ∈ Z∗q.
Theorem 1. In Algorithm 2, under the assumption that an attacker knows the MN’s
private key, SMN , the attacker is still unable to create the shared key KMN−FG.
Proof. To create a valid KMN−FG, the attacker needs to compute the following pairing
functions:
KMN−FG = ê(QFG, YFG)
a.ê(SMN , TFG)
Since the attacker knows SMN , it easily computes ê(SMN , TFG). However, to compute
ê(QFG, YFG)
a, the attacker needs to know the value of a. But the attacker knows only
P and TMN = aP . Thus this problem is equivalent to ECDLP. Since ECDLP is a hard
problem, the attacker cannot create a valid KMN−FG in a polynomial time.
The Traffic Analysis Attack
The traffic analysis attacker attempts to capture a group of the transmitted packets and
analyze them in order to learn the identity and the location of the mobile node. The
identity of the mobile node, which is represented by its home address, is transmitted in an
encrypted form. Therefore, the traffic analysis attacker cannot learn the true identity of
the mobile node. Moreover, we use onion routing to prevent the attacker from correlating
the input and output messages at a specific hop. For example, the binding update messages
that are transmitted from an MN are repeatedly encrypted by three different keys: the
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shared key with the home agent, the intermediate foreign gateway’s public key, and the
shared key with the foreign gateway. When the foreign gateway receives these messages,
it decrypts them using the shared key with the mobile node, and then retransmits the
decrypted messages to the IFG. These decrypted messages are indeed messages encrypted
by the remaining two keys. Therefore, at each hop, the messages are decrypted by one key
then retransmitted to the next hop. Consequently, the attacker cannot identify the mobile
node’s movements.
The Collusion Attack
The collusion attack may be triggered among the foreign gateways, the intermediate foreign
gateways, or the correspondent nodes. When our proposed schemes are used, a collusion
attacker gains no information about the mobile node’s identity and locations.
If the foreign gateways collude with each other, they would not learn the identity of the
mobile node. In the setup stage, the mobile node uses a pseudo identity, PIDMN = CoA‖ti,
to identify itself to the FG. The MN’s CoA, which is used to create the PIDMN , changes
as the mobile node chooses different foreign gateways; hence MN’s PIDMN also changes.
Therefore, each foreign gateway identifies only one PIDMN of the MN’s pseudo identities.
It is thus not possible for the FGs to link all the care of addresses to the same MN.
Moreover, the collusion of the intermediate foreign gateways reveals nothing about
MN’s privacy, because they do not directly communicate with this MN. In our network,
IFGs only communicate directly with the home agent and the foreign gateway. The IFG
receives an MN’s encrypted CoA, which represents the MN’s location. Again when it
roams among different foreign networks, the MN acquires different care of addresses and
encrypts them by different keys. Therefore, if IFGs collude, they cannot link all encrypted
CoAs to the same MN. Collusion among the FGs and the IFGs can reveal the mobile
node’s home agent, but this knowledge of the mobile node’s home agent does not break
the MN’s privacy, because we argue that there are at least two nodes in the home network.




, n > 2 (3.8)
where n is the number of nodes in the home network. Thus, with a large number of nodes
located in the MN’s home network, the probability of identifying the MN after identifying
its network is negligible.
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The Replay Attack
In the setup stage, an attacker may send a previously transmitted pseudo identity to the
foreign gateway in order to deceive the foreign gateway and learn the MN’s partial private
key, DMN . In our proposed schemes, the MN’s pseudo identity, PIDMN = CoA‖ti, is
created by concatenating MN’s CoA with the time stamp. The time stamp prevents the
attacker from repeating transmission of previous messages. However, any legitimate user
who knows the group key can decrypt the message, change the time stamp, and then resend
the message again. From Theorem 1, we prove that even if a legitimate user succeeds in
learning the MN’s secret key, this user is still unable to create a valid shared key, KMN−FG.
The MITM Attack
A man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacker may change either MN’s identity, PIDMN , or public
key, PMN , to create a fake session with the FG. We prove by Theorem 2 that if either
PIDMN or PMN is changed in the middle of transmission, then the key generation algorithm
returns “illegal MN”.
Theorem 2. If either PIDMN or PMN = (XMN , YMN) is changed by an attacker, then
Algorithm 2 returns “illegal MN”.
Proof. Case 1: If PIDMN is changed to `PIDMN ,then from Theorem 1, the at-
tacker cannot create KMN−FG = ê(QFG, YFG)
a.ê(SMN , TFG) because the attacker
does not know the values of a and SMN . Thus the attacker is an illegal MN.
Case 2: If PMN is changed to `PMN = ( `XMN , `YMN), then the condition at line 2
of Algorithm 2 is satisfied. This means ê( `XMN , P0) 6= ê( `YMN , P ), and Algorithm
2 returns “illegal MN”.
In addition, an MITM attacker may send a fake partial private key, DMN , to the MN
in the setup stage. This case also happens if the FG is a malicious node and wants to
mislead the MN. The result of this attack leads to an interruption of the MN’s IP session.
In our proposed schemes, however, the MN authenticates the FG by verifying its signature
as illustrated in the setup stage- further, the MN also checks the correctness of the partial
private key that is received from the FG, using the following condition:
IF ê(DMN , P ) 6= ê(QMN , P0), wrongDMN
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We can show that for a correct DMN , the two pairing functions are identical, as follows:
ê(DMN , P ) = ê(s×QMN , P )
= ê(QMN , s× P )
= ê(QMN , P0)
(3.9)
3.7 Performance Evaluation
3.7.1 Computation and Communication Overhead
Tables 3.3 and 3.4 show the computation and communication overheads of the proposed
sub-schemes, AHBU and ARR, compared to those of the mix-based scheme [33] with
one mix server, and the EHoA and PHoA schemes [35]. In addition, we use Crypto++
benchmarks [83] to measure the computation time at the mobile node’s side, as shown
in Figure 3.11. We use the ElGamal encryption mechanism for public key encryption
operations, and the AES scheme for symmetric encryptions. According to Crypto++
benchmarks, the modulus and exponent sizes used for ElGamal encryption are 2048 and 226
bits, respectively. Therefore, in the tables, TELG represents the time needed for ElGamal
encryption operation, TSym represents the time needed for AES encryption or decryption,
Tpid and Tprf represent the time needed to construct a pseudonym and to generate a
random number, and TEHOA−reg and TPHOA−reg represent time needed for registering the
encrypted and the pseudo home addresses. For computation overhead, BSignalling represents
bytes needed to send the control information, while BEHoA−reg and BPHoA−reg represent
bytes needed to send a PHoA and EHoA registration messages.
Table 3.3: AHBU Computation and Communication Overheads.
Computation Communication
Mix-Based 3TElG + 2TSym Bsignaling
+ 2Tprf + Tpid
AHBU TElG + 3Tsym Bsignaling
In Table 3.3, our AHBU’s computation overhead is smaller than the mix-based scheme’s
overhead by 66%. The mix-based scheme requires three public key encryption operations
while the AHBU scheme requires only one public key operation.
Table 3.4 shows that the ARR sub-scheme is the second least time-consuming after the
mix-based. In EHoA and PHoA schemes, an MN needs first to register the encrypted home
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address and pseudo home address before using them. Considering 5ms for one Round Trip
Time (RTT) between the MN and its home agent, the computation overheads of EHoA and
PHoA schemes are much higher than that of the ARR sub-scheme. ARR’s computation
overhead is smaller than the overhead of EHoA and PHoA by 79% and 89%, respectively.
Figure 3.11 shows the time consumption for the ALPP scheme compared to other schemes.
The measured AHBU and ARR computation overheads do not include the time required
for the setup stage, Tsetup, because this time is only needed once per MN’s stay on a given
foreign network. If an MN sends many home binding update messages from the same
foreign network, then only one Tsetup is required. The setup time can be measured as
follow:
Tsetup = 2TSym + Tverification + 3Tpairing (3.10)
Considering the AES scheme for Tsym, and the RSA scheme for signature verification
time, Tverification, the estimated time needed for Tsetup, is around 120 ms. To measure
the pairing time, Tpairing, we consider a 2.93 GHz processor with the Tate pairing in [83]
and get 6.83 ms for each pairing function. Following the Crypto++ benchmarks, the used
Elliptic Curve field size is GF(2n) where operations are implemented using trinomial basis.
We also use 17 as the RSA scheme public exponent.
Table 3.4: ARR Computation and Communication Overhead.
Computation Communication
Mix-Based 3Tsym + BSignaling
THash + 2Tpid
EHOA 3Tsym + TEHoA−reg BEHoA−reg
PHOA TPid + 2TPHoA−reg BPHoA−reg
ARR 2Tsym + 2TElG BSignaling
3.7.2 Power Consumption
Aiming to compute the energy consumed at MN, we follow the energy costs of cryptographic
algorithms that are proposed in [84] for two different PDAs, a Compaq iPAQ3970 and an
HP Hx2790. As shown in Figure 3.12, compared to the Mix-based scheme, the AHBU sub-
scheme has the lowest energy consumption for both PDA types. AHBU achieves energy
reductions of 65.66% and 66% when using Compaq iPAQ3970 and HP Hx2790, respectively.
This is due to using only one public key operation, while the mix-based scheme uses three.
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Figure 3.11: ALPP Computation Overhead
According to [84], one public key scheme requires 40.87mJ and 25.87.17mJ to encrypt a
message in iPQ3970 and Hx2790, respectively.
3.7.3 Simulation Results
Based on the anonymizer scheme [69], we have proposed a new method of routing in which
the transmitted binding update message is sent to an intermediate node, IFG, instead of
sending it to the receiver directly. The selected home intermediate foreign gateway works
as an anonymizer. Unlike the traditional anonymizer, which is a fixed proxy that serves
all nodes and can easily break mobile nodes’ privacy, our anonymizer changes with each
mobile node and it cannot reveal the privacy information.
We develop a simulator to compare the effect of the updated routing method used by
both AHBU and ARR sub-schemes with that of the original routing method, which does
not ensure privacy for any MN.
Two kinds of mobile nodes are defined in our simulator. The first type, called the
successful node, is the node that succeeds in finding an intermediate foreign gateway on
the shortest path between the communicating parties. The second type, called the failed
node, is the node that moves to a neighbor network, so the shortest path length is only
one hop, from HA to FG. Therefore, the failed node cannot find an intermediate gateway
on the shortest path.
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Figure 3.12: AHBU Power Consumption
Table 3.5: MIPv6 Networking Simulation Parameters.
Parameter Value
System size 5500m× 5500m
Network numbers in system 36
Network size 1000m× 1000m
Number of nodes per system 1000 - 36000 nodes
Overlapping area 100m
Distribution of nodes Uniform
Mobility model Random Waypoint model
Nodes maximum speed range 2 m/sec - 20 m/sec
Nodes minimum speed 0 m/sec
Number of HA per network one
We consider 351 simulation runs, where the number of nodes in the system increases
from 1000 nodes in the first run, to 36000 nodes in the last. We consider a large number of
nodes in order to check the scalability of our proposed scheme. At each run, the maximum
node speed ranges from 2 m/sec to 20 m/sec. The time interval between each run is 10
minutes. We use the Bellman-Ford routing algorithm for message routing among gateways.
Table 3.5 shows the full simulation parameters.
Figure 3.13 shows the routing delays of the proposed sub-schemes, compared with the
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Figure 3.13: Routing delay at different mobility speeds.
home binding update (HBU) scheme and the triangle routing that is used by the mobile
IPv4 protocol. HBU and triangle routing schemes are used as lower and upper references,
respectively. In this figure, we measure the routing delay for a highly dense networking,
36000 nodes density.
As shown in the figure, the proposed sub-schemes (AHBU, ARR sub-scheme with fixed
CN scenario, and ARR sub-scheme with mobile CN scenario), have very similar routing
delays to that of the HBU. The HBU scheme does not apply any anonymity or location
privacy services. This result indicates the ability of using our proposed schemes with
scalable networks and real-time applications in which the routing delay is an important
factor. The reported difference in the routing delays between our proposed schemes and
the HBU results from the failed nodes. In our simulation, the failed nodes do not apply
our updated routing method, since there is no IFG on the shortest path. An alternative
solution is that the failed nodes can select any IFG at an adjacent network. In this case,
routing delay values may depend on the network traffic, because the adjacent network is
not located on the shortest path between the two communicating parties.
We also notice that the routing delay of the triangle routing method is larger than our
schemes’ delays. The triangle routing method ensures an MN’s location privacy, but its
high delay prevents its use for seamless communications. Our sub-schemes’ routing delays
are smaller than the triangle routing delay by an average of 32%.
Figure 3.14 shows the network routing delay for different network capacities at high
56
node mobility, 20 m/sec. It can be seen that the number of nodes in the network does
not have a significant impact on the routing delay, but the nodes’ mobility speed has a
large impact on this delay. Compared to the HBU scheme, our proposed sub-schemes, the
AHBU, ARR-fixed CN, and ARR-mobile CN schemes, increase the routing delays by 2.7%,
4%, and 20% respectively. On the other hand, compared to the triangle routing scheme,
our sub-schemes decrease the routing delays by 42%, 43%, and 30% respectively.




























Figure 3.14: Routing Delay with different network capacity.
Figure 3.15 shows the number of successful and failed nodes with a 36000-node system
and at different node speeds. It can be seen that the number of failed and successful nodes
depends on the speed of the node. With mobility speeds below 8 m/sec, the number of the
successful nodes increases as the nodes’ speeds increase. However, with mobility speeds
above 8m/sec, the numbers of successful and failed nodes are fixed. This result confirms
that our schemes are more appropriate to be used in high mobility environments.
Additionally, we obtain the 95% confidence intervals (CIs) for both the successful nodes
numbers’ and the average routing delay. Table 3.6 shows the CIs with different system
densities and mobility speeds, in which we consider low density as 1000 nodes and high
density as 36000 nodes. Similarly, we consider low mobility as 2 m/sec and high mobility
as 20 m/sec.
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Figure 3.15: successful and failed nodes at mobility speeds.
3.8 Summary
In this chapter, based on the onion routing, anonymizer, and certificate-less public key
cryptography, we have proposed an anonymous and location privacy preserving scheme
(ALPP) to be employed in MIPv6 control signalling for heterogeneous networks. In addi-
tion, we have introduced a mutual authentication scheme as well as a key establishment
scheme to be used among mobile nodes and foreign gateways in visiting networks.
The ALPP scheme involves two complementary sub-schemes, anonymous home binding
update (AHBU) and anonymous return routability (ARR). The AHBU and ARR sub-
schemes are employed to ensure anonymity and location privacy for a roaming mobile
node that sends an MIPv6 home binding update and return routability messages to their
home agent and correspondent node, respectively. In addition, the ARR sub-scheme can
be used for both a fixed correspondent node that is located in its home network, and a
roaming correspondent node that moves out from its home network. The challenge in the
roaming correspondent node’s case is to support anonymity and location privacy for a two
moving nodes. The idea of both AHBU and ARR sub-schemes relies on introducing an
intermediate entity, called the Intermediate Foreign Gateway (IFG), into the scenarios of
sending the HBU and RR control messages. The IFG allows the roaming mobile node
to hide its identity from its foreign gateway and hide its current location from its home
agent and correspondent node. Therefore, both MN’s anonymity and location privacy are
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Table 3.6: 95% Confidence Interval of AHBU sub-scheme.
successful nodes
Density Mobility mean st.dev CI
low low 868 44.26 [781, 955]
low high 876 10.55 [855.7, 897.1]
high low 31273 1516.7 [28300, 34246]
high high 31465 112.88 [31244, 31686]
Average Delay
Density Mobility mean st.dev CI
low low 73.22 1.58 [70.12, 76.32]
low high 73.81 0.99 [71.86, 75.76]
high low 73.63 1.32 [71.04, 76.22]
high high 73.36 0.18 [73, 73.72]
achieved.
By the help of using the onion routing idea, we repeatedly encrypt the messages sent
from the mobile node and change the mobile node identity, location, and encryption keys
for each layer of encryption. In addition, the idea of the anonymizer is adapted to have
a different anonymizer, i.e., IFG, each time the mobile node sends a message. Therefore,
the IFGs cannot collude to reveal the MN’s identity and locations. Furthermore, we have
proposed a mutual authentication and key establishment schemes between the roaming
mobile node and its foreign gateway. The difficulty of creating a security association
between those two arbitrary nodes, the mobile node and its foreign gateway, makes it a
challenge to build trust between them. Using the certificate-less public key cryptography,
we present an efficient and secure authentication scheme between such arbitrary nodes.
The proposed authentication scheme allows the two parties to authenticate each other
without constructing a public key infrastructure in the network. In addition, after this
mutual authentication, the mobile node and the foreign gateway establish a shared key
between them to be used in subsequent communications.
To analyze the privacy achieved by our proposed scheme, we use the entropy model
to compare the degree of anonymity of both our scheme and the mix-based scheme. The
degree of anonymity reflects the information known by the attacker about the mobile node
identity. With a large number of senders in our system, the degree of anonymity in our
scheme ends up between 60% and 85%, whereas the mix-based scheme encounters a high
delay while increasing the degree of anonymity. Regarding the location privacy, we prove
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that when implementing the ALPP scheme, no network entity except the mobile node itself
can identify this node’s location, which is represented by the mobile node’s care-of address.
In our security analysis, we prove that when using our proposed key establishment
scheme, and under the assumption that the attacker knows the mobile node’s private key,
the attacker still is unable to create the shared key between the mobile node and the foreign
gateway. In addition, we also prove that if either the mobile node identity or its public
key is changed by an attacker, our proposed key establishment can detect this forgery.
Therefore, based on these proofs, we show that the ALPP scheme thwarts traffic analysis,
collusion, replay, and man-in-the middle attacks.
To evaluate the performance, we measure the computation and communication over-
heads as well as the power consumption of our proposed scheme, compared to previous
anonymity and location privacy schemes. In addition, using extensive simulations, we
show that our proposed sub-schemes decrease the routing delays by 42% for the AHBU
sub-scheme, 43% for ARR-fixed correspondent node, and 30% for ARR-mobile node, com-
pared to the triangle routing scheme.
As a privacy protocol, the ALPP scheme maintains the balance between network per-
formance and the privacy level, especially with the mobile node’s high speed mobility that
is required for mobile networks such as vehicular networks. However, using the MIPv6 as
the underlying mobility management protocol, which suffers a high delay in certain sce-
narios, our proposed scheme cannot increase network performance. Therefore, applying
our proposed scheme for different mobility management protocols, such as the network
mobility protocol, NEMO, gives much better performance improvement.
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Chapter 4
EM3A: Efficient Mutual Multi-hop
Mobile Authentication Scheme for
PMIP Networks
4.1 Introduction
An important requirement for current mobile wireless networks, such as VANETs, is that
they be able to provide ubiquitous and seamless IP communications in a secure way. More-
over, these networks are envisioned to support multi-hop communications, in which inter-
mediate nodes help to relay packets between two peers in the network. Therefore, in
infrastructure-connected multi-hop mobile networks, the connection from the mobile node
(MN) to the point of attachment may traverse multiple hops (Figure 4.1).
The reasons for relaying packets in infrastructure-connected mobile networks are twofold:
1) direct connection to the infrastructure may not always be available, thus, by using re-
layed communications, the network coverage can be extended, and its throughput and
capacity can also be increased [85]; and 2) Relay Nodes (RNs) may benefit from offering
their services as temporary relays; different cooperation incentive schemes have shown that
it is in the best interest of each node to participate in multi-hop packet forwarding and
earn credits that reward them per forwarded packets [86].
In this chapter, we propose an efficient mutual authentication scheme for multi-hop-
enabled PMIP networks, EM3A, which thwarts authentication attacks, including DoS,
colluding, impersonating, replay, and man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks. We also offer a
61
Figure 4.1: Infrastructure-connected multi-hop mobile network. MNa is roaming to a
relayed communication through relay node MNb
case study of applying our proposed scheme in a novel Multi-hop Authenticated Proxy Mo-
bile IP (MA-PMIP) Scheme for Asymmetric VANET [87]. EM3A thwarts authentication
attacks when handovers occur through the Infrastructure-to-Vehicle-to-Vehicle (I2V2V)
communications, while achieving reduced overhead. In addition, we present a key es-
tablishment scheme based on symmetric polynomials [88–90], which generates a shared
secret key between MN and RN. Compared to existing authentication schemes, our pro-
posed scheme achieves higher secrecy as well as lower computation and communication
overheads. For a domain with n MAGs, our scheme achieves t×2n−secrecy, whereas exist-
ing symmetric polynomial-based authentication schemes achieve only t−secrecy. Extensive
simulation is performed to show that our scheme can be used with seamless handover, since
it results in low authentication delay. In addition, the proposed key establishment scheme
achieves lower revocation overhead than that achieved by existing symmetric polynomial-
based schemes.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 reviews the related
work. Section 4.3 describes our system models, including network, threat, and trust models,
and a review of symmetric polynomials. The proposed scheme is introduced in Section 4.4.
The security analysis and performance evaluation are presented in Sections 4.5 and 4.6,
respectively. The MA-PMIP scheme is offered in Section 4.7 as a case study. Finally, the
summary is presented in Section 4.8.
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4.2 Related Work
For the problem of security and authentication schemes for multi-hop wireless networks [91],
previous works have mainly focused on two different approaches: 1) end-to-end authenti-
cation, which employs a relay node (RN) to only forward the authentication credentials
between mobile node and the infrastructure; and 2) hop-by-hop authentication, which
implements authentication algorithms between each pair of hops. Following the first ap-
proach, in [92] the MN uses a trusted delegation entity and its public key certificate to
authenticate itself to the foreign gateway. On the other hand, the scheme in [93] uses both
a symmetric key for authenticating an MN to its home network, and a public key for mu-
tual authentication between home network and foreign network. However, the expensive
computation involved with public key operations tends to increase the end-to-end delay.
Conversely, a symmetric key-based authentication scheme for multi-hop Mobile IP is
proposed in [94]. In that work, an MN authenticates itself to its home authentication
server (HAAA) using the extensible authentication protocol [95]. After a successful au-
thentication, the HAAA derives a group of keys to be used by the MN, including a shared
master key, extensible master key, and foreign MIP key. Despite the low computation
and communication overheads, the symmetric key-based schemes cannot achieve as strong
levels of authentication as those achieved by public key-based schemes. This is because
the sharing of the secret key between the two peers increases the chances for adversaries
to identify the shared key. Instead, public key-based schemes create a unique secret key
for each user; hence, it is more difficult for adversaries to identify the keys.
Following the second approach, a mutual authentication that depends on both secret
splitting and self-certified schemes is proposed in [96]. However, both schemes are prone
to DoS attacks. Another scheme for hop-by-hop authentication, called Alpha, is presented
in [97]. In Alpha, the MN signs the messages using a hash chain element as the key for
signing, and then delays the key disclosure until receiving an acknowledgement from the
intermediate node. Although Alpha protects the network from insider attacks, it suffers
from a high end-to-end delay. A hybrid approach, the adaptive message authentication
scheme (AMA), is proposed in [98]. AMA adapts the strength of the security checks
depending on the security conditions of the network at the moment of packet forwarding.
AMA works under the assumption that the entire network cannot be attacked at the same
time. In some spots, the adversary attacks all the transmitted messages, while in other
spots there is no attack at all. Consequently, AMA proposes two different modes: a relaxed
mode, to be used as default mode, and a check-all mode, which is used when attacking is
discovered.
Different from the aforementioned authentication schemes, in this chapter we propose
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a light-weight mutual authentication scheme, EM3A, to be employed between the mobile
node and the relay, which mitigates the high delay that is introduced by previous hop-
by-hop schemes. This then means that the proposed scheme can be used with seamless
handover operations in multi-hop VANET during the I2V2V communications, as illustrated
in Section 4.7.
4.3 System Model
4.3.1 Network and Communication Model
Consider an infrastructure-connected multi-hop mobile network such as that depicted in
Figure 4.1. The IP mobility support in MNs is provided by means of an adapted version of
PMIP for multi-hop domains [36]. The only modification we introduce to [36] is the strict
requirement for the MN to first connect directly to a MAG in order to obtain a valid IP
prefix in the domain. Once an MN joins the domain for the first time, it sends Router
Solicitation(RS) messages, which are employed by the MAG as a hint for detecting the
new connection. After the PMIP signalling has been completed, the MAG announces the
IP prefix in a unicast RA message delivered to the MN over the one-hop connection. After
that, the MN may eventually divert to use an RN to reach the fixed network. We also
assume that, after authenticating them, legitimate nodes in the PMIP domain faithfully
follow the routing protocol when they are selected to provide their relay services for another
MN in their surroundings.
The multi-hop communications that are studied in our system model are those occurring
between MN and RN, when the MN intends to maintain a connection to the infrastructure.
Applications of multi-hop mobile networks have been largely studied not only for vehicular
communications networks, but also for wireless personal area networks [99], and wireless
local area networks [100].
4.3.2 Threat and Trust Models
We consider both internal and external adversaries. Internal adversaries are legitimate
users who exploit their legitimacy to harm other users. Thus, having the same capabilities
as the legitimate users, internal adversaries have authorized credentials that can be used
in the PMIP domain. Two types of internal adversaries are defined: impersonation and
colluder. The former impersonates another MN’s identity and sends neighbor discovery
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messages, such as Router Solicitation, through the relay node. The latter colludes with
other domain users using their authorized credentials in order to identify the shared secret
key between two legitimate users.
In the case of external adversaries, these are unauthorized users who aim at identifying
the secret key and breaking the authentication scheme. These adversaries have high-quality
monitoring devices so they can eavesdrop on messages transmitted between an MN and
an RN. Moreover, they can inject their own messages and delete other authorized user’s
transmitted messages as well. We consider replay, MITM, and DoS attacks as external
adversaries. The goal of the MITM and replay attacks is to identify a shared key between
two legitimate users, while the goal of the DoS attack is to exhaust the system resources
following a kind of irrational attack. DoS attackers can also be considered as internal
adversaries when the attacker is one of the legitimate nodes.
In our model, we consider the LMA and all MAGs in the domain to be trusted entities.
An MN trusts its first attached MAG in such a way that this MAG does not reveal the MN’s
evaluated domain polynomial, which is used by the MN to create shared keys with relay
nodes. In addition, the MN trusts the LMA that maintains the secret domain polynomial,
which can be used to reveal the shared keys for all nodes in the network.
4.3.3 Symmetric Polynomials
A symmetric polynomial is defined as any polynomial of two or more variables that achieves
the interchangeability property, i.e., f(x, y) = f(y, x). Such a type of mathematical func-
tion is often used by key establishment schemes to generate a shared secret key between two
entities. A polynomial distributor, such as the access router, securely generates a symmet-
ric polynomial and evaluates this polynomial with each of its users’ identities. For example,
given two users identities 1 and 2, and the symmetric polynomial f(x, y) = x2y2 +xy+ 10,
the resultant evaluation functions are f(1, y) = y2 + y + 10 and f(2, y) = 4y2 + 2y + 10,
respectively. Then, the polynomial distributor keeps the original polynomial secured, and
sends the evaluated polynomials to each user in a secure way. Afterwards, the two users
can share a secret key between them by calculating the evaluation function for each other.
Continuing with the previous example, if user 1 evaluates its function f(1, y) for user 2, it
obtains f(1, 2) = 16. In the same way, if user 2 evaluates the function f(2, y) for user 1,
it obtains f(2, 1) = 16. Therefore, both users share a secret key, 16, without transmitting
any additional messages to each other.
New decentralized key generation schemes are proposed in [89], [90] to generate a shared
secret key between two arbitrary MNs that are located in two heterogeneous networks.
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These schemes achieve t−secrecy level, where t represents the degree of the generated
polynomial. A scheme with t−secrecy property can be broken if t + 1 users collude to
reveal the secret polynomial. Moreover, for only one MN’s revocation, the decentralized
schemes require changing the entire system’s keys, which leads to a high communication
overhead. Later in section 4.6, we show how EM3A reduces the revocation overhead, and
increases the achieved secrecy level.
4.4 Efficient Mutual Multi-hop Mobile Authentica-
tion Scheme (EM 3A)
EM3A consists of three main phases: a key establishment phase, for establishing and
distributing keys; a mobile node registration phase, for MN’s first attachment to the PMIP
domain; and an authentication phase, for mutually authenticating the MN and RN.
4.4.1 Key Establishment Phase
Considering a unique identity for each MAG, the LMA maintains a list of those identities
and distributes them to all legitimate users in the PMIP domain. The MAGs list’s size
depends on the number of MAGs in the domain. For n MAGs, each legitimate MN requires
(n× log n) bits to store this list. We argue that such storage space can be adequately found
in mobile networks, such as vehicular networks. The LMA is also authorized to replace
the identity of any MAG with another unique identity (this is specially useful for the
management of MN’s revocation, as it will be illustrated in Section 4.4.4).
Each MAG in the domain generates a four-variable symmetric polynomial f(w, x, y, z),
which we call the network polynomial, and then sends this polynomial to the LMA in
its domain. After collecting all network polynomials, fi(w, x, y, z), i = 1, 2, ....n, from
every MAGs (MAG1,MAG2, ......,MAGn), the LMA computes the domain polynomial,
F (w, x, y, z), as follows:
F (w, x, y, z) =
l∑
i∈Rn
fi(w, x, y, z), 2 ≤ l ≤ n (4.1)
where n is the number of MAGs in the domain. The LMA randomly chooses and sums
l network polynomials from the received n polynomials in order to construct the domain
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polynomial. The reason for not summing all the network polynomials is twofold: increasing
the secrecy of the scheme from t−secrecy to t × 2n−secrecy, and decreasing the revoca-
tion overhead at the time of MN’s revocation. After constructing the domain polynomial
F (w, x, y, z), the LMA evaluates it for each MAGs identity, IDMAG, individually. The
LMA then securely sends to each MAG its corresponding evaluated polynomial. Later on,
the evaluated polynomials, F (IDMAGi, x, y, z), with i = 1, 2, ...., n, are used to generate
shared secret keys among arbitrary nodes in the domain.
4.4.2 MN Registration Phase
When an MN first joins the PMIP domain, it authenticates itself to the MAG to which it
is directly connected. This initial authentication may be done using any existing authenti-
cation schemes, such as RSA. After guaranteeing the MN’s credentials, the first-attached
MAG securely replies by evaluating its domain polynomial, F (IDMAG, x, y, z), using the
MN’s identity, to obtain F (IDMAG, IDMN , y, z). Afterwards, the LMA also sends the list
of current MAGs’s identities to the MN.
The MN stores the received list along with the identity of its first-attached MAG
(IDFMAG). As a result, a mobile node a can establish a shared secret key with an-
other mobile node b in the same PMIP domain, by evaluating its received polynomial,
F (IDFMAGa, IDa, y, z), to obtain F (IDFMAGa, IDa, IDFMAGb, IDb). Similarly, b evaluates
its received polynomial, F (IDFMAGb, IDb, y, z), to obtain F (IDFMAGb, IDb, IDFMAGa, IDa).
Since the domain polynomial, F , is a symmetric polynomial, the two evaluated polynomi-
als result in the same value and they represent the shared secret key between mobile nodes
a and b, Ka−b.
4.4.3 Authentication Phase
Figure 4.2 illustrates the MN-RN authentication phase. When an MN roams to a relayed
connection, the neighbor discovery messages for movement detection in the multi-hop-
enabled PMIP scheme must go through an RN. The goal of the authentication phase is to
support mutual authentication between the roaming MN and the RN. After a successful
authentication phase, the RN ensures that the MN is a legitimate user, and the MN ensures




The MN sends a Router Solicitation (RS) or Neighbor Solicitation message that includes
its identity and its first attached MAG’s identity, IDFMAG−MN . Therefore, the intended
RN checks its stored MAGs list to see if IDFMAG−MN is currently a valid identity. If there
is no identity equals to IDFMAG−MN , the RN rejects the MN and assumes it is a revoked
or malicious node. Otherwise, if IDFMAG−MN is a valid identity, the RN continues with
the next step to check the MN’s authenticity.
Challenge generation:
By using the MN’s identity and IDFMAG−MN , the RN generates the shared keyKMN−RN
as described in the registration phase. The RN then constructs a challenge message, which
includes its own identity, IDRN , the MN’s identity, a random number NonceRN , and a time
stamp tRN . Finally, the RN encrypts the challenge message using the shared key, KMN−RN ,
and sends it, along with IDRN and its first attached MAG’s identity, IDFMAG−RN , to the
MN.
Response generation:
After receiving the challenge message, the MN checks IDFMAG−RN using its stored
MAGs’ identities list. When guaranteeing that IDFMAG−RN is a valid identity, the MN
reconstructs the shared key, by using the RN’s identity and IDFMAG−RN , and then decrypts
the received challenge message. The MN accepts the RN as a legitimate relay if the RN’s
decrypted identity is the same as the identity received with the challenge message, i.e.,
IDRN . The MN then constructs a reply message, which includes RN’s identity, NonceRN ,
tRN , a new random number NonceMN , and a time stamp tMN . The MN encrypts the reply
message using the shared key, and sends it to the RN, which decrypts the message and
accepts the MN as legitimate user if the decrypted NonceRN equals to the original random
number that the RN sent in the challenge message.
Once the authentication phase is completed, the neighbor discovery messages are prop-
erly forwarded toward the MAG, which allows for the multi-hop-enabled PMIP to continue
its operation as described in [36] and maintain seamless communications. In Figure 4.2,
Enc(K, M) represents an encryption operation of a message M using a key K. In addition,
the Router-Solicitation, Challenge, and Reply are the three messages transmitted between
the MN and the RN.
4.4.4 Mobile Node Revocation
To achieve backward secrecy, EM3A should guarantee that a revoked MN does not use
any of its previous shared keys to deceive the RN. When an MN is revoked, the LMA re-
places this MN’s first-attached MAG’s identity, IDFMAG−MN , with another unique identity,
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Router-Solicitation [ IDMN, IDFMAG-MN ]
  Enc( KMN-RN, Challenge [ IDRN, IDMN, NonceRN, tRN] ), IDRN, IDFMAG-RN
  Enc( KMN-RN, Reply [ IDRN, NonceRN, tRN, NonceMN, tMN] )
MN RN
Figure 4.2: EM3A authentication phase.
IDNFMAG, and sends the new identity to all legitimate nodes in the domain. Subsequently,
each legitimate node updates its stored MAGs list by replacing the old identity with the
new one. The LMA also sends a message to each MAG in the domain, which includes a
list of the mobile nodes that have IDNFMAG as their first-attached MAG’s identity, along
with an evaluated polynomial, F (IDNFMAG, x, y, z), for the FMAG’s new identity. After-
wards, the MAGs send the evaluated polynomial for those MNs that are in the received list
and under MAGs’ coverage areas. Eventually, each mobile node, in the MNs list, receives
a new evaluated polynomial, F (IDNMAG, IDMN , y, z), for both its identity and the new
first-attached MAG’s identity. Therefore, instead of changing the entire domain keys, only
the MNs that share the same IDFMAG−MN need to change their evaluated polynomials
and keys.
Figure 4.3 shows an example of the revocation operation. Consider a revoked MN4
with a first-attached MAG as MAG3. Three main messages are transmitted. The LMA
first changes the MAG3 identity to MAG03 and then broadcasts the new identity to all
MNs in the domain. The second message transmitted from the LMA to all MAGs and it
includes the new evaluated polynomial with the new identity, F (IDMAG03, x, y, z), along
with the MNs that share the MAG3 as their first-attached MAG. in the Figure, MN2,
MN5, and MN10 are those intended nodes. Note that the nodes sharing the first-attached
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MAG may not be located under the same MAG’s control, therefore the LMA sends the
second message to all MAGs. Finally, the last message is transmitted from the MAGs to













1- Broadcast: IDMAG3 changed to IDMAG03
2- To MAGs: F(IDMAG03, x,y,z), MN5,MN2,MN10
3-  F(IDMAG03, IDMN5,y,z)
3-  F(IDMAG03, IDMN2,y,z)
3-  F(IDMAG03, IDMN10,y,z)
LMA
Figure 4.3: EM3A MN Revocation.
4.5 Security Analysis
The security of our proposed scheme is based on the secrecy level of the key establishment
phase proposed in Section 4.4.1. Therefore, in the following subsections we compute the
security level of EM3A scheme, and show that it thwarts both the internal and external
adversaries defined in Section 4.3.2.
4.5.1 Internal Adversaries
The proposed EM3A authentication scheme thwarts impersonation attacks by using a
shared secret key, which is only known by the two communicating entities. To illustrate
this, consider an adversary A, which aims at impersonating an MN in order to join a new
MAG through an RN, and illegally benefit from the domain services. First, A sends an RS
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message and attaches the MN’s identity, IDMN . The RN replies with a challenge message,
which is encrypted by the shared key KMN−RN . In order to pass the authentication check,
A needs to decrypt the challenge message and identify the RN’s random number, NonceRN ,
which is included in the encrypted challenge message. However, A cannot reconstruct the
shared key by using only the identities of the MN and RN. In addition to the identities,
the adversary needs to know one of the evaluated polynomials, F (FMAGMN , IDMN , y, z)
or F (FMAGRN , IDRN , y, z). Since the evaluated polynomials are secret, it is impossible
for an impersonation adversary to break EM3A.
Moreover, EM3A mitigates the impact of a collusion attack by increasing the secrecy
of the proposed key establishment scheme. Generally, a t−degree symmetric polynomial
allows for a t−secrecy scheme, which means that t + 1 colluders are needed to identify
the secret polynomial and reconstruct the whole system’s keys. However, in EM3A, the
domain polynomial is constructed as in (4.1), where the LMA randomly selects a group of
the network polynomials to calculate the domain polynomial. Considering the following
theorem, we show that at least t×2n+1 colluders must collude to break our authentication
scheme.
Theorem 3. The proposed key establishment in EM3A scheme achieves t × 2n secrecy
level.
Proof. If we consider the secrecy of each network polynomial as t, then the secrecy s of



























= t× [2n − (1 + n)]
' t× 2n (4.2)
where n is the number of MAGs in the domain and t is the degree of network polynomials.
Since the secrecy increases from t to t × 2n, the number of colluders that can break the
scheme also increases from t+ 1 to (t× 2n) + 1.
To show the significance of increasing the secrecy level, consider a PMIP domain with
10 MAGs and a symmetric polynomial of degree 10. On one hand, in traditional symmetric
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polynomial based key establishment schemes, only 11 colluders (t+1) can break the system
by revealing the used secret polynomial. On the other hand, in our scheme, EM3A, the
number of colluders increases to be 1001 ((t× 2n) + 1), which is 10-doubles of the original
colluders. Consequently, as a way to impede the colluder attacks in our scheme, t is chosen
to be a large number, and n should be preferably large.
4.5.2 External Adversaries
Similar to impersonation attacks, DoS attackers may trigger forged RS messages in order
to exhaust the RN and MAG resources. Without EM3A, the RN forwards all RS messages
to the MAG and facilitates the DoS attack. However, using EM3A, a DoS adversary A
should know a valid shared key, KMNi−RN , in order for the RN to forward the RS message.
Since A is an external adversary, it cannot construct any key, even if it knows the identity
of a legitimate MN. On the other hand, A may repeat one of the RS messages that have
been previously transmitted by a legitimated user, in order to trigger a replay attack.
However, EM3A thwarts this attack by adding both time-stamps and random nonces for
each transmitted message between the MN and the RN. Finally, A may trigger an MITM
attack in order to impersonate an MN or an RN. However, given that both the challenge
and reply messages are encrypted, A cannot replace the MN or RN identities. Once more,
A would need to know the shared key first in order to perform such attack.
4.6 Performance Evaluation
4.6.1 Computation and Communication Overheads
In this section, we evaluate the EM3A scheme compared to previous multi-hop authenti-
cation schemes. Tables 4.1 and 4.2 show the computation and communication overheads
for EM3A comparisons. T represents the required time for an operation and B represents
the transmitted bytes. Our scheme has the smallest computation overhead among other
schemes, because EM3A requires only two symmetric-key encryption operations ( 2×Tc).
Both the AMA [98] and GMSP [93] require time for signing and verifying signatures (Ts,
Tv), hence their computation overheads are higher than that in EM
3A. Like our proposed
scheme, the multi-hop MIP scheme [94] consumes little time in computation; however,
it requires high communication overhead to exchange a large number of keys. Moreover,
ALPHA [97] requires an extra time (Tdisclose) to delay the disclosure of the secret key. We
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employ Crypto++ benchmark [83] to compare the cost of each scheme. We use AES and
RSA 1024 symmetric and public key operations respectively, in order to calculate the com-
putation time required by the different schemes. The Round Trip Time (RTT) considered
between vehicle and relay node is 5ms.
Table 4.1: EM3A Computation Overhead.
Scheme Computation overhead Time(ms)
AMA [98] Ts + Tv × Prcheck 2.55
GMSP [93] Ts + Tv + Tc 2.60
Multi-hop MIP [94] Tc + TEAP .0194
ALPHA [97] Tc + Tdisclose 7.5094
EM3A 2× Tc .0194
Considering the communication overhead perspective, we observe that AMA, GMSP,
and multi-hop MIP require transmission of a sender certificate in each transmitted message.
Instead, the EM3A scheme exchanges the list of MAGs only once at the key establishment
phase, and the challenge/response messages (BCHL−RESP ) during handovers. The average
length of the X.509 certificate is 3500 bytes, while the list of MAGs has a length of n log2 n
bits, where n is the number of MAGs in the PMIP domain. Therefore, in order for EM3A
to have a higher communication overhead than that in the other schemes, it would have
to satisfy the condition n log2 n ≥ 28000bits ×m, where m is the number of transmitted
messages in the certificate-based schemes. Consequently, n should be at least 236.64
√
m
to satisfy such a condition. However, since n is a fixed value, and m increases over time
with the length of active sessions, n becomes much smaller than m with time. Therefore,
the condition cannot be satisfied and EM3A’s communication overhead is clearly lower
when compared with the certificate-based schemes. Even when a lightweight certificate
is used instead of the X.509 certificate, the EM3A communication overhead is still lower
than those with certificate-based schemes where certificates need to be appended to each
message transmitted to different relay in the network. Note that ALPHA [97] results in the
smallest communication overhead, but it suffers from a Tdisclose delay in the computation
overhead, which is required before disclosing the secret key.
4.6.2 Simulation Results
We evaluate the impact of EM3A in the overall performance of the network when an MN
experiences handovers that involve the use of RNs. Experiments were conducted through
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Multi-hop MIP [94] BEAP +Bkey−exchange
ALPHA [97] BACK +Bdisclose
EM3A BFMAGs−list
simulations using OMNET++ tool. The RTT between LMA and MAGs is fixed to 10ms.
A server for the downloading of data traffic is located in an external network, so that RTT
between server and LMA is 20ms. The MN is moving at different speeds that cause the
frequency of handovers to vary from one every 10s to one every 50s (i.e., highly dynamic
and slow changing scenarios). We consider the worst-case scenario in which every time the
MN handovers to a new MAG, it first connects to an RN, so that EM3A authentication
is required before the exchange of neighbor discovery packets and PMIP signalling may
happen. Other details of the simulation parameters are provided in Table 4.3.
Table 4.3: PMIPv6 Network Simulation Parameters.
PHY Layer 2.4GHz, 5.5Mbps, 100mW Tx power, -110dBm sensitivity
MAC Layer 802.11 ad hoc mode, 150m radio range
Traffic type/rates UDP / VBR video (mean 600Kbps),
VBR audio (mean 320Kbps), CBR best effort 100Kbps
Session time ∼3min
Figure 4.4(a) shows the average throughput obtained for the multi-hop-enabled PMIP,
when the EM3A scheme is de-activated and activated respectively. It can be observed
that the authentication scheme does not impact communications negatively, and that the
achieved performance is almost equivalent to that achieved when no authentication has
been activated. Thanks to the registration phase, which is executed when every node
first joins the PMIP domain. At the moment of handover, EM3A requires only one RTT
between MN and RN before allowing for the continuation of normal handover signalling
(i.e., the forwarding of RS from MN to MAG, the PMIP signalling between MAG and
LMA, and the router advertisement message sent back to MN). The downside of such
registration phase is the overhead and storage required for sending and maintaining the
list of current identities for all the MAGs in the domain.
To better illustrate the impact of EM3A, we provide the details for the handover delay
74
(a) Average throughput.
(b) Handover delay increase.
Figure 4.4: Comparison of performance between EM3A and non-secure multi-hop-enabled
PMIP.
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(a) Packet losses for CBR traffic. (b) Packet losses for VBR audio
traffic.
(c) Packet losses for VBR video
traffic.
Figure 4.5: Average packet losses obtained by EM3A compared to non-secure multi-hop-
enabled PMIP.
obtained during highly dynamic and slowly-changing scenarios in Figure 4.4(b). When the
EM3A has been activated , the delay increases by ∼1.1% and ∼ 2.5% in each scenario.
Consequently, the low computation overhead of the symmetric key encryption/decryption
operations makes the authentication process a light-weight mechanism for securely using
multi-hop communications in PMIP domains.
Figure 4.5 illustrates the performance of the network in terms of packet losses for
real time (audio and video) and best effort traffic. In general, the employment of the
authentication scheme does not present a major impact compared to non-secure multi-hop
PMIP. In the most demanding scenario, where handovers occur every 10s, a low 0.03%
average increment among the three types of traffic results from the delay caused by the
processing of EM3A traffic. In the case of medium-to-slow changing scenarios, packet
losses remain as low as 1%, and EM3A accounts only for a 0.01% increment.
4.7 Case Study: MA-PMIP for Asymmetric VANET
Multi-hop Authenticated PMIP (MA-PMIP) for Asymmetric VANETs [87] is a new pro-
posed scheme in which we demonstrate that multi-hop paths are useful tools for improving
the performance of infotainment applications and Internet access in vehicular environments.
Moreover, different from previous works that assume symmetric links among all wireless
devices, we handle asymmetric links, and demonstrate that multi-hop communications are
key for avoiding service breakage in the asymmetric VANET. In addition, and most im-
portantly, we implement our efficient and mutual authentication scheme, EM3A, and deal
with the proposed MA-PMIP scheme to thwart authentication attacks when handovers
occur through I2V2V communications.
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The aforementioned contributions comprise the design goals of our Multi-hop Authenti-
cated Proxy Mobile IP (MA-PMIP) scheme, which to the best of our knowledge, is the first
to combine a predictive IP mobility scheme designed for multi-hop asymmetric VANET,
with the security issues of employing I2V2V communications. In the following subsections,
we first explain the network model for the MA-PMIP, then we briefly explain the han-
dover operation through I2V2V communications in MA-PMIP, and finally we evaluate the
computation overhead of our authentication scheme when implemented with MA-PMIP
comparing to other previous schemes. For more detail about the novel MA-PMIP scheme,
the reader is referred to [87].
4.7.1 MA-PMIP Network Model
We consider a vehicular communications network such as the one shown in Figure 4.6.
Connections to the infrastructure are enabled by means of road-side Access Routers (ARs),
each one in charge of a different wireless access network. Vehicles are equipped with wireless
interfaces, as well as GPS systems that feed a location service from which the location of
vehicles is obtained. Beacon messages are employed by vehicles to inform about their
location, direction, speed, acceleration, and traffic events to their neighbors.
The ARs employ a higher transmission power than the one employed by vehicles. There-
fore, we consider the presence of asymmetric links in the VANET. The delivery of packets
is assisted by a geographic routing protocol. To serve this protocol, a location server stores
the location of vehicles, and is available for providing updated responses to queries made
by the nodes’ geo-networking layer. In order to forward packets within the multi-hop
VANET, a virtual link between AR and vehicle is created [56]. That means that a geo-
routing header is appended to each packet, where the location and geo-identifier of the
recipient are indicated. In this way, the geo-routing layer is in charge of the hop-by-hop
forwarding through multi-hop paths, with no need of processing the IP headers at the
intermediate vehicles.
The ARs service areas are well-defined by the network operator. A well-defined area
means that messages from ARs to the VANET are only forwarded within a certain geo-
graphic region [45]. Each AR announces its services in geocast beacon messages with the
flag AccessRouter activated. The beacons are forwarded through multi-hop paths as long as
the hops are located inside the coordinates indicated by the geocast packet header. In this
way, vehicles in the connected VANET can extract information from the geocast header,
such as AR’s location, AR’s geo-identifier, and the service area limiting coordinates. We
assume the infrastructure is a planned network with non-overlapping and consecutive ser-
vice areas. Note that, although service areas are consecutive, some locations within them
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are not reachable through one-hop connections. This may be caused by weak channel
conditions, and by the asymmetric links between ARs and vehicles.
To ensure the proper operation of the geo-routing protocol and MA-PMIP, it is required
to maintain state information at the entities exchanging IP packets. The following are the
required data structures:
Neighbors Table: stores information about the neighboring nodes. The table in-
dicates a link type unidirectional or bidirectional for each neighbor. A node detects the
bidirectional links in the following way: incoming links are verified when beacon messages
are received from neighbors (i.e., this node can hear its neighbors); outward links are ver-
ified by checking the neighbors’ locations and the node’s transmission power, in order to
calculate if such neighbors are inside the radio range (i.e., the neighbors can hear this
node).
Default gateway table: stores information about the AR in the current service area.
It contains the AR’s geo-identifier and the service area coordinates. If the destination of a
packet is an external node, the geographic routing forwards the packet toward the default
gateway indicated in this table. Then, the AR routes the packet to its final destination.
We only consider IP-based applications accessed from the VANET. Such applications
are hosted in external networks that may be private (for dedicated content), or public,
such as the Internet. Since we have selected PMIP for handling the IP mobility in the
network, all the ARs are assumed to belong to a single PMIP domain. The AR and MAG
are co-located in our model. Therefore, the terms AR and MAG are used interchangeably
in the following sections.
Unlike [45], in our scheme the AR does not send Router Advertisement (RA) messages
announcing the IP prefix to vehicles in the service area. Instead, when a vehicle joins the
network for the first time, individual IP prefixes are allocated through PMIP. It is required
by MA-PMIP to obtain this initial IP configuration only when a one-hop connection exists
between vehicle and MAG, so that authentication material is securely exchanged for future
handovers of the vehicle over multi-hop paths. Note that a one-hop connection between
two nodes is only established when a bidirectional link exists between them.
4.7.2 MA-PMIP Handover Operation
The signalling of MA-PMIP for initial IP configuration follows the standard PMIP. Once
the vehicle joins the domain for the first time, it sends Router Solicitation(RS) messages,

















Figure 4.6: MA-PMIP network model.
PMIP signalling has been completed, the MAG announces the IP prefix in a unicast RA
message delivered to the vehicle over the one-hop connection.
Figure 4.7 shows the basic MA-PMIP signalling employed when a vehicle experiences
a handover through a relay. The movement detection could be triggered by any of the
following events: 1) the vehicle has started receiving AR geocast messages with a geo-
identifier different from the one registered in the default gateway table; or 2) the vehicle
has detected its current location falls outside the service area of the registered AR. If the
vehicle loses one-hop connection toward the MAG, but is still inside the registered service
area, then no IP mobility signalling is required and packets are forwarded by means of the
geo-routing protocol.
After movement detection, the RS message is an indicator for others (i.e., relay vehicle
and MAG) of the vehicle’s intention to re-establish a connection in the PMIP domain.
Thus, an authentication is required to ensure that both mobile router and relay are legiti-
mate and are not performing any of the attacks described in Section 4.3.2. Therefore, we
apply our proposed EM3A scheme explained in Section 4.4 to implement the authentica-
tion required in MA-PMIP. Once the nodes are authenticated, the RS packet is forwarded
until it reaches the MAG, and the PMIP signalling is completed in order to maintain the
IP assignment at the vehicles new location. To take advantage of the location information
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in VANET, we propose a prediction mechanism that enables a timely handover procedure.
























Figure 4.7: MA-PMIP handover through I2V2V communications.
4.7.3 Authentication Evaluations
To measure and compare the impact of the MA-PMIP authentication mechanism, we have
integrated an implementation of AMA [98], with a simplified version of a multi-hop PMIP
scheme (i.e., MA-PMIP with our proposed authentication mechanism disabled).
Figure 4.8 shows the authentication delay when the vehicle moves at different average
speeds. Figure 4.9 depicts the comparison in terms of authentication overhead to payload
ratio. As shown in both figures, MA-PMIP not only requires smaller delay and commu-
nication overhead than Multi-hop PMIP & AMA, but also has almost fixed impact for
different speeds. On the other hand, Multi-hop PMIP & AMA have authentication delay
and communication overheads that increase almost linearly with speed. Compared with
Multihop PMIP & AMA, MA-PMIP achieves 99.6% and 96.8% reductions in authentica-
tion delay and communication overhead, respectively. The reason for these reductions is
80
the high computation and communication efficiency achieved by our proposed authenti-
cation scheme. Therefore, unlike Multi-hop PMIP & AMA, MA-PMIP can be used with
seamless mobile applications, such as VoIP and video streaming. Figure 4.10 shows a com-
parison between our proposed authentication scheme. Therefore, unlike Multi-hop PMIP
& AMA, MA-PMIP can be used with seamless mobile applications, such as VoIP and video
streaming.

























Multi-hop PMIP & AMA
Figure 4.8: MA-PMIP authentication delay
4.8 Summary
In this chapter, an efficient authentication scheme, EM3A, has been proposed to be em-
ployed between a mobile node and a relay node in a multi-hop-enabled PMIP domain.
With EM3A, both the mobile node and relay node guarantee the legitimacy of each other,
and construct a shared key using a novel proposed symmetric polynomial-based key estab-
lishment scheme.
The multi-hop communications that are studied in our system model are those occurring
between MN and RN, when the MN intends to maintain a connection to the infrastruc-
ture. In such a multi-hop communication, both MN and RN relate to the same PMIP
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MA-PMIP 
Figure 4.9: MA-PMIP communication overhead.
domain while there is no pre-security association between them. Therefor, we employ the
symmetric polynomials to generate a shared key between those arbitrary nodes. Unlike
previous symmetric polynomial schemes that are used to generate a shared key between
two arbitrary nodes, our proposed scheme increases the secrecy level achieved in the key
establishment from t-secrecy to t× 2n-secrecy. This results in hardening against collusion
attacks, which requires at least t × 2n + 1 colluders rather than just t + 1 to reveal the
shared key and break the secure system.
Furthermore, we have mitigated the problem of mobile node’s revocation by proposing
new security steps that also achieve mobile node backward secrecy. Compared to the
traditional revocation that changes all system keys, our revocation changes only the keys
of the mobile nodes sharing the same first attached mobile access gateway (MAG). However,
the trade-off is to store an MAG’s list of identities in each authenticated mobile node.
From a security analysis perspective, we show that EM3A thwarts internal adversaries,
including impersonation and collusion attacks, and external authentication adversaries,
including replay, MITM, and DoS attacks. In addition, we show that our proposed scheme
achieves a higher secrecy level than that achieved by other symmetric polynomial authenti-
cation schemes, and lower computation and communication overheads than those achieved
by multi-hop authentication schemes. By means of simulations, we have shown that EM3A
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Figure 4.10: Comparison of computation time
results in a low delay and allows for seamless communications, even in highly mobile/highly
traffic-demanding scenarios.
To show the impact of our proposed scheme, we present a case study implemented
in vehicular networks, which is a proposed authentication multi-hop PMIP scheme, MA-
PMIP. We have implemented the EM3A in the multi-hop communication of the proposed
MA-PMIP scheme. Compared to the AMA-PMIP that employed another authentication
scheme (AMA), our MA-PMIP protocol with EM3A achieves 99.6% and 96.8% reductions
in authentication delay and communication overhead, respectively.
Although it offers high network-performance when employed with multi-hop vehicular
networks, PMIP is not as popular a protocol for ITS as is the NEMO protocol. Therefore, in






Mobile Public Hotspots in a
NEMO-based VANET
5.1 Introduction
As an extension of MIPv6, NEMO protocol works appropriately for a scenario such as the
one depicted in Figure 5.1, where a Wi-Fi hotspot is deployed in a large van (bus, train,
plane) and called a NEMO-based VANET [7, 58, 101, 102]. In such networks, the OBU
inside a vehicle also works as a Mobile Router (MR) to support a group of Mobile Network
Nodes (MNNs) located inside the vehicle with required communications.
In this chapter, we modify the ideas of obfuscation and power variability to propose
a strong physical-layer location privacy scheme, the fake point-cluster based scheme, that
can be used in public hotspots for NEMO-based VANET. To the best of our knowledge, the
fake point-cluster based scheme is the first to apply obfuscation, i.e., concealing, to a user’s
location by an exact location rather than a wide area. Unlike existing obfuscation schemes,
which are employed in the current Location Based Service (LBS), our proposed scheme
thwarts such a physical-layer attacker who tries to exploit the high-accuracy positioning
schemes to define the sender’s exact location. In addition, unlike current power variability















Figure 5.1: NEMO-based VANET.
that we call a fake point, therefore, it is difficult to mitigate the impact of the power
variabilities.
The fake point-cluster based scheme combines two independent sub-schemes: fake point
and cluster based. The idea of the fake point sub-scheme is that each sender selects
and considers a random point inside the hotspot, called fake point, when calculating the
packet transmission power. Therefore, when many senders select the same fake point,
the attacker’s received signals strengths measured for different senders will be equalized.
Hence, the attacker is confused and the sender’s location privacy is protected because
the attacker calculates the sender’s location wrongly. In addition, the cluster-based sub-
scheme prevents some of the attacker’s monitoring devices from detecting the sender’s
signals, hence, decreasing the accuracy of the attacker’s positioning system.
To analyze our location privacy scheme, we use three different metrics: correctness,
accuracy, and certainty. We conclude that the probability of an attacker localizing a
sender, when the fake point sub-scheme is employed, decreases as the ratio of the number
of attacker’s monitoring devices and the number of defined spatial grid points in the network
increases, because the possibility that the selected fake point is an attacker’s monitoring
device’s location increases leaving the attacker confused. However, since the number of
spatial grid points is always much larger than the number of attacker’s monitoring devices,
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the probability of localizing the sender by an attacker is quite large. Therefore, we combine
the proposed cluster based sub-scheme with the fake point sub-scheme to decrease this
probability. In addition, using extensive simulations, we show that our fake point-cluster
based scheme achieves 23% and 37% decreases in the average sender’s power and the MNN-
AP routing path length, respectively, over the fake point sub-scheme because in the fake
point-cluster based scheme, the MNN selects a nearer fake point located in the neighbor
cluster.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.2 discusses the wireless
position estimation systems as the preliminaries. Section 5.3 reviews the related work.
The system model and threat model are presented in Section 5.4. The proposed fake
point-cluster based scheme is introduced in Section 5.5. The security analysis and the
performance evaluation are introduced in Sections 5.6 and 5.7, respectively. Finally, the
chapter summary is presented in Section 5.8.
5.2 Preliminaries
5.2.1 Wireless Position Estimation
Our threat model relates to a physical-layer attacker who exploits positioning systems
in order to reveal a sender’s physical location from the received signal strength (RSS).
Therefore, the wireless positioning systems [103] are illustrated in more detail, in order to
more deeply understand the attacker’s strategy. In this sub-section, the two steps of the
wireless position estimation process, distance measurement and location estimation, are
described in detail.
The goal is to accurately estimate the mobile user’s location inside a wireless network,
such as Wi-Fi or a cellular network, when the user transmits signals. Starting with the
distance measurement step, the mobile user’s signal parameters are measured and the
distances to the sender are estimated at certain reference points distributed across the
network. Received signal strength (RSS), time of arrival (ToA), time difference of arrival
(TDoA), and angle of arrival (AoA) are examples of the signal parameters. From the
attacker’s perspective, the RSS parameter is the best to use because unlike other signal
parameter, RSS measuring requires only inexpensive equipment [103]. Therefore, in this
sub-section, we focus on RSS-based estimation, in which each reference point at distance
d from the mobile user measures the received signal power, p̄(d), as follows:
P̄ (d) = P0 − 10n log(d/d0) (5.1)
86
where P0 is the received signal power to a known location that is located at distance d0 from
the reference point, and n is the path loss exponent, which depends on the propagation
model of the signal in the wireless environment. In addition to the path-loss, the received
power signal is also affected by both the shadowing and the fast fading (mutipath). In
practice, with a long time interval of the signal observation, the effect of the multipath
is excluded. Therefore, the received power is modeled to include the path-loss modeled
in (5.1), and the shadowing modeled as a zero mean Gaussian random variable with a
variance σ2. The RSS measurement can be modeled as follows:
P (d) ∼ N(P̄ (d), σ2) (5.2)
After measuring the RSS at a reference point i located in (xi,yi), the estimated distance,
fi(x, y) to the sender is measured as follows:
fi(x, y) =
√
(x− xi)2 + (y − yi)2 (5.3)
In the second step, location estimation, two techniques for location estimation are
defined: 1) mapping (fingerprinting); and 2) geometric and statistical. The mapping tech-
niques rely on an off-line training phase in which a database of different RSS estimations
and their correspondent senders’ locations is created. Depending on the training phase, a
mapping method is used to match a new measured RSS value to entities in the database.
In our NEMO-based hotspot, we assume that attackers cannot perform the training phase.
Still alternatively, the geometric and statistical techniques can be used. In geometric
techniques, the position of the mobile node (MN) can be estimated as the intersection of
position circles obtained from RSS measurements that are estimated at different reference
points. Since each RSS forms a circle, at least three reference points are needed to define
the intersection point. This process is called triangulation, depicted in Figure 5.2. In
addition, using the statistical techniques, the location of the MN can be defined as follows:
Z = f(x, y) + η (5.4)
where Z = [Z1, Z2, ...., ZN ]
T , f(x, y) = [f1(x, y), f2(x, y), .....fN(x, y)]
T , and η = (η1, η2, ...., ηN)
T
are the parameters collected from each reference point i as follows:
Zi = fi(x, y) + ηi, i = 1, 2, .....N (5.5)
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Figure 5.2: Attack triangulation on MNN
where N is the number of reference points, and fi(x, y) is the distance that a reference
point i estimates for the sender location (x, y) by using the measured RSS value as in (5.3),
and ηi is the estimation error at this reference point.
After collecting the estimated distances from all reference points, a general estimation
θ = [x, y]T of an MN’s location is calculated. Based on knowledge of the probability density
function (pdf) of the estimation error, η, parametric or non-parametric techniques can be
used. Non-parametric techniques such as fingerprinting are employed if the error’s pdf is
not defined, while parametric techniques such as Bayesian and maximum likelihood (ML)
estimators are used when the error’s pdf is known. The Bayesian approach is used in the
presence of a prior pdf on θ, π(θ) in order to minimize the cost function of estimating
θ by using either the minimum mean square error, θ̂MMSE, or the maximizing posterior
estimations, θ̂MAP as follows:
θ̂MMSE = E{θ | Z} (5.6)
θ̂MAP = arg max
θ
P (Z | θ)π(θ) (5.7)
On the other hand, the ML estimation is used when π(θ) is unknown, to maximize the
likelihood function.
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θ̂ML = arg max
θ
P (Z | θ) (5.8)
P (Z | θ) = Pη(Z − f(x, y) | θ) (5.9)
where Pη is the conditional pdf of an estimation error condition on θ.
In RSS-based estimation, the error vector is assumed to be independent and is modeled
as a zero-mean Gaussian. Therefore, (5.9) can be written as follows:
P (Z | θ) =
N∏
i=1



















Hence the ML estimator can be calculated as follows:




(Zi − fi(x, y))2
σ2i
(5.13)
However, if we assume correlated Gaussian error components instead of independent
components, the estimated ML can be written as follows:
θ̂ML = arg min
[x,y]T
(Z − f(x, y))TΣ−1(Z − f(x, y)) (5.14)
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Figure 5.3: Wireless position estimation.
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5.3 Related Work
Due to the open nature of wireless networks, hiding the transmitted wireless signals, and
hence achieving physical layer location privacy is considered a challenging goal. In location
privacy attacks, the attacker localizes the victim MNN by measuring its RSSs at certain
reference points, as illustrated in Section 5.2.1. To thwart these attacks, [40] suggests em-
ploying a scheme in sensor networks called Hyberloc. In this scheme, the anchor nodes
protect their location from the un-trusted nodes, while trusted nodes can easily localize
those anchor nodes. The main idea of Hyberloc is to randomly choose a power for trans-
mitting signals and attach this random power value in the transmitted encrypted packets.
Therefore, having a shared key, only trusted nodes can identify the true sender’s location.
However, changing the transmission power values is considered to provide only weak loca-
tion privacy, because the attacker can easily fix these changes by multiplying the RSS at
all monitor devices by a factor. In our proposed scheme, in addition to changing power
levels as is done in Hyberloc, we confuse the attacker’s monitoring devices by letting their
measured RSSs be equalized for different MNNs; therefore, it becomes difficult for the
attacker to mitigate the increase in power.
Another scheme, hidden anchor, which relies on adding noise to the transmitted signals,
is proposed in [42]. In this scheme, the anchor nodes use their neighbors’ identities to hide
their own identities from distrusted nodes, and at the same time encrypt and attach their
real identities in the transmitted packets sent to trusted nodes. However, changing the
nodes’ identities does not achieve a sender’s physical-layer privacy; rather, it helps in
achieving link-layer location privacy. In addition, both anchor and trusted nodes add noise
to their transmitted messages in order to prevent un-trusted nodes from measuring the
RSSs and revealing their locations. However, adding noise to the transmitted messages
affects transmission quality.
Obfuscation, i.e., concealment, proposed in [41], is another way to protect a user’s loca-
tion privacy from location-based servers (LBSs). The idea of the obfuscation is to replace
the real location information with fake information in order to decrease the accuracy of the
localization process employed by LBS, and hence increase a user’s location privacy. Three
obfuscation techniques are proposed in [41]: enlarged area, shifted center, and reduced
radius. In location-based applications, the user’s location returned to the LBS represents
an area rather than a specific location, therefore, obfuscation schemes are used to hide the
true information about that area. However, these obfuscation schemes are not appropri-
ate for Wi-Fi scenarios where the adversary gets a specific MNN’s location rather than
an area. In our proposed scheme, we modify the idea of obfuscation in order to return a
wrong location point rather than a wide area.
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With the goal of achieving obfuscation for users’ information, [104] achieves user iden-
tity, time, and location obfuscation. User identity obfuscation, concealing the identity,
is carried out by frequently changing a user’s pseudonymity, while time obfuscation, con-
cealing transmission time, is carried out by applying a silent period to thwart pseudonym
correlation attacks. The silent period is defined in such a way as to increase a user’s privacy
level and hence decrease the positioning system’s accuracy. Unlike the identity and time
obfuscation that are mainly employed for link-layer obfuscation, location obfuscation is
employed to achieve physical-layer location privacy. Assuming a fingerprinting positioning
system, [104] achieves location obfuscation by proposing a silent Transmit Power Control
(TPC) scheme that reduces transmission power at each user. Therefore, the number of
APs that detect the transmitted signals decreases, as does the accuracy of the attacker’s
localization. The challenge of silent TPC is to allow users to change their transmission
power without exchanging any information with their APs. Our proposed cluster-based
scheme employs the same idea of TPC to reduce a user’s transmission power. However,
unlike our proposed scheme, the silent TPC scheme considers location attackers located
only in neighbor networks rather than those located in the user’s current network.
In [105], two strategies for a user’s location privacy have been proposed with a main
idea of using a smart antenna that emits a directional radiation pattern instead of using
isotropic antennas. In the first strategy, using a smart antenna, the MNN maximizes the
transmission power of the signals directed to the AP located in its network while preventing
other APs from receiving any signals transmitted from this MNN. Therefore, other APs
cannot triangulate this MNN and hence fail to reveal its location. On the other hand,
if an MNN fails to prevent at least four APs from receiving its signals, then the MNN
tries the second strategy in which the MNN maximizes the RSS localization bias at the
APs around this MNN. By increasing the localization bias, the MNN guarantees that its
surrounding APs estimate its position wrongly. To achieve the first strategy, the MNN first
listens to the periodically received beacon packets that are transmitted by the nearby APs.
The MNN then passively measures the RSSs of these beacon packets to estimate the APs’
locations. However, if the APs change their power levels, then the MNN cannot estimate
their locations and hence fails to protect this MNN’s location privacy. In addition, the
assumption of having a smart antennas in all MNNs is not reasonable due to their high
cost.
In [106], a scheme called silent period is used to achieve physical and link-layer location
privacy. It thwarts correlation attacks, so an attacker cannot relate two pseudonyms to the
same MNN. A silent period is defined as a constant period, followed by a variable length
period, in which an MNN changes its pseudonym and then keeps silent, not sending any
messages. When an MNN starts sending frames after the silent period, the attacker cannot
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correlate between the MNN’s new and old pseudonyms. However, this scheme degrades
network performance when the MNN stops its transmission for some periods. In addition,
a precise duplicate address detection scheme should be employed to ensure that the new
pseudonym does not conflict with any other addresses in the network.
Phantom is another scheme proposed in [107], to achieve sender physical-layer location
privacy by creating a group of ghost transmitters, which retransmit the original transmit-
ter’s messages. Therefore, the attacker that uses an RSS-based fingerprinting localization
scheme to localize the original transmitter receives a combination of both original signals
and ghost signals. The power of the phantom comes from the inability of the adversary
to distinguish between those signals. Although phantom achieves a high level of privacy,




A NEMO-based public hotspot is installed inside a large van, which in turn, constructs
VANET communications with its neighbor vehicles, as depicted in Figure 5.1. In addition
to running a VANET routing protocol, the OBU of this van also works as a NEMO Mobile
Router (MR) and runs a NEMO BS protocol; hence, it is denoted as OBU/MR. Inside the
large van, Mobile Network Nodes (MNNs) represent different mobile devices such as cell
phones, PDAs, and laptops.
We employ a MANET-centric approach to integrate NEMO and VANET protocols;
therefore, only OBU/MR implements a NEMO BS protocol in addition to the MANET
routing. All neighbor vehicles that are located on the OBU/MR-RSU path, including
the RSU, implement only a MANET routing scheme, such as georouting protocols, as
illustrated in Figure 2.6.
The communications among an OBU/MR and MNNs are generally structured using
the IEEE 802.11 standard to form a Wi-Fi network, while the communications among
OBU/MR and the road-side access points, which are employed to support the OBU/MR
with the Internet connectivity, are applied by applying the NEMO BS protocol in VANET.
In this paper, we focus on the communications of a vehicle’s Wi-Fi network, which indeed
are affected by the NEMO-VANET communications outside the vehicle.
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Due to the varieties of link-layer connections in NEMO-based VANET, as illustrated in
Figure 5.1, three different MR-passengers communications types can be found in the Wi-Fi
hotspot: in-vehicle, neighbor vehicles, and nested communications. The in-vehicle com-
munications, the focus of this paper, are constructed among the in-vehicle MR that works
as a hotspot’s AP and passengers’ devices inside the same vehicle. Neighbor vehicle com-
munications can be created among an OBU/MR inside one vehicle and some passengers’s
devices inside neighbor vehicles. This kind of communication relies on the connectivity
between vehicles; however, due to the diversity of vehicles’ speeds and mobility models,
neighbor communications face connections intermittencies, which lead to a degradation
in network performance. Nested communications, also called nested-NEMO, are formed
among a vehicle’s MR and some passengers’ devices under the control of another MR,
which in turn, is under the control of this vehicle’s MR.
In our model of a hotspot, The OBU/MR is located in the front of the vehicle and
controls the whole hotspot, while all other MNNs are located randomly in the van and
the transmission power signal of OBU/MR is considered to be much higher than those
of MNNs. In addition, considering the same transmission environment for all MNNs, we
assume Gaussian noise with zero mean and σ2 variance for all signals propagated inside
the hotspot.
In addition, we assume that the OBU/MR logically divides the hotspots into k grid
points, and attaches them to its periodically transmitted beacon, therefore, MNNs inside
the hotspot use those grid points to implement our proposed scheme, as illustrated in
Section 5.5.
5.4.2 Threat and Trust Models
A passive physical layer location privacy attacker deploys monitoring devices inside the
whole network, in order to detect any transmitted signal and estimate the location of the
sender using the received signal strength as illustrated in Section 5.2.1. The attacker’s
monitoring devices are assumed to have high sensing and processing capabilities, and their
positions in the network can be changed by the attacker. Using the measured RSSs, each
monitoring device estimates and transmits the distance to the intended sender to the
attacker. Employing an ML estimation technique, the attacker uses the received distance
estimations from all monitoring devices to estimate the exact location of the MNN. For
more information about the ML statistical technique, the reader is referred to Section 5.2.1.
To attach itself to a hotspot, each MNN authenticates itself to the hotspot’s MR and
shares a secret key in order to encrypt its data-link frames, including its MAC address.
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Being unable to decrypt the transmitted frames’ MAC addresses, the attacker depends
only on the RSS measurements to localize the MNN. Many data-link authentication and
location privacy schemes [50], [25,108–113] can be used to secure a data-link layer’s frames.
To apply a mutual authentication scheme among the MNNs and the OBU/MR, the
OBU/MR periodically transmits its public-key certificate inside the hotspot, and we con-
sider that there exists at least one online certificate verification server whom MNNs trust
and use to verify the OBU/MR’s certificate. Due to the multihoming technology that
enables mobile devices to simultanously attach to different networks, the MNNs can access
the online certificate verification by an alternative Internet connection other than the mo-
bile hotspot connection. For example, a cell phone can use its cellular network to connect
to the Internet and verify the received certificates.
5.5 Fake Point-Cluster based Physical Layer Location
Privacy Scheme
The proposed fake point-cluster based scheme is a combination of two sub-schemes, fake
point and cluster based, that can be employed individually to provide physical-layer loca-
tion privacy for MNNs inside a NEMO-based VANET hotspot. The fake point sub-scheme
achieves a higher location privacy level if the attacker’s monitoring devices are located at
the selected fake points’ locations, while the cluster based sub-scheme achieves a higher
location privacy when preventing attacker’s monitoring devices from detecting the trans-
mitted signals. In Section 5.6, we show that the proposed fake point-cluster based scheme
increases the MNN’s location privacy level. In the next subsections, fake point and cluster-
based sub-schemes are presented, and then a scheme for their combination is explained.
5.5.1 Fake Point Location Privacy Sub-Scheme
The proposed fake point location privacy scheme is employed to protect MNNs’ physical lo-
cation privacy from insider passive attacks, which are explained in Section 5.4.2. The main
idea is that, inside the hotspot, the MNNs select random locations, called fake points, that
are used to confuse the attacker. The MNNs consider these fake points when calculating
their transmission signals power. Therefore, if an attacker’s monitoring devices are located
at these fake points, then the measured RSS values at the monitoring devices are similar
for all MNNs selecting the same fake point. In Section 5.6.2, the probability of having at
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least two MNNs choose the same fake point’s location that contains an attacker’s monitor-
ing device is calculated. Therefore, these monitoring devices encounter some error when
estimating the distances to MNNs. Depending on the error, the overall MNNs’ location
estimations also have some deviations, and hence the MNNs’ location privacy is ensured.
Bootstrapping the hotspot
Working as an AP, the OBU/MR broadcasts inside its network some beacon frames
that contain its location, (XOBU/MR, YOBU/MR), and a unique received signal power, Pu,
that all MNNs in the network must consider when calculating their transmission signal
powers. Using the AP’s location and the required received power, the MNNs can define
the distances to their AP and hence calculate appropriate transmission signal powers. The
beacon frames also contain the mobile network prefixes (MNPs) for each MNN to select a
unique MNP, and hence to be able to attach to the MENO, AP’s certificate (CERT) for the
MNNs, to check the authenticity of the AP. An authentication scheme such as in [50] can
be used to achieve mutual authentication between MNNs and AP. After successful mutual
authentication between the MNN and AP, the AP virtually divides the hotspots into K
spatial grid points and securely sends the grid points’ list to the authenticated MNN. In
the remainder of this chapter, we use AP, OBU/MR, and MR interchangeably to represent
the Wi-Fi AP.
MNN attachment
To connect to the available hotspot, the MNN first calculates the distance dMNN−AP
to its AP as follows:
dMNN−AP =
√
(XMNN −XAP )2 + (YMNN − YAP )2 (5.15)
where (XMNN , YMNN) is the MNN’s current location measured by the MNN’s GPS. Using
this calculated distance and the required received power at AP, Pu, the MNN calculates
its transmission power,Ptr, as follows:
Pu = α− 10β log(dMNN−AP ) (5.16)
where β is the path loss and α is a function of the transmission power Ptr. Instead of
using the calculated transmission power, Ptr, the MNN uses another power, Ṕtr, calculated
related to a fake location that the MNN selects in the next step.
Identifying fake point
Inside its network, the MNN randomly selects a location, which we will call the fake
point, from the grid points list that the AP securely sends to the authenticated MNN as
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mentioned in the Bootstrapping phase. Therefore, the fake point is one of the K spatial
grid points that is defined by the AP, and represents a location (x, y) inside the hotspot.
Using (5.15), the MNN recalculates its distance to the AP as the sum of the MNN-fake
point distance and the fake point-AP distance, and then the MNN employs this distance
to recalculate the transmission power ,Ṕtr using (5.16). Therefore, the MNN recalculates
the transmission power, Ṕtr, in such a way that the MNN’s signal is transmitted first
to this fake point then to the AP. However, in our scheme, the MNN does not send its
signals to this fake point; rather, it sends the signals directly to its AP. This deceiving
action is only to confuse attackers. As depicted in Figure 5.4, the distance between the
MNN and its AP, dMNN−AP , is always less than the sum of the distances of MNN-fake
point, dMNN−F , and fake point-AP, dF−AP . Consequently the power transmitted from the
MNN to the AP directly, Ptr, is less than that goes through the fake point, Ṕtr. The
main goal of selecting a fake point in the network is to have a possibility that one of the
attacker’s monitoring devices is located at this fake point. Therefore, when many MNNs
select the same fake point, and an attacker’s monitoring device is located in this fake point
as depicted in Figure 5.5, the estimated distances calculated by this monitoring device
encounter much more estimation error then those calculated by other monitoring devices.
Since the measured RSSs at the monitoring device are functions of the distances to the
MNN, the recorded error increases as the distance between MNNs that selected the same
fake points increases. In Section 5.6, the error encountered at the monitoring devices is
measured to show the strength of the MNN’s location privacy when using our proposed
scheme.
To calculate the transmission signal power, Ṕtr, the MNN randomly selects a fake point,
(XF , YF ). Given the received signal power at AP is Pu, the signal power at the fake point,
Pftr, can be calculated as follows:
Pu = f(Pftr)− 10β log(dF−AP ) (5.17)
dF−AP =
√
(XF −XAP )2 + (YF − YAP )2 (5.18)
The MNN can then calculate the transmitted power to the fake point as follows:
Pftr = f(Ṕtr)− 10β log(dMNN−F ) (5.19)
dMNN−F =
√
(XF −XMNN)2 + (YF − YMNN)2 (5.20)
The MNN transmits its messages with the new calculated power, Ṕtr. In addition,
the MNN selects a new fake point for each transmitted signal; therefore, the possibility of

























Figure 5.5: MNNs select same fake point
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5.5.2 Cluster-based Location Privacy Sub-Scheme
In this sub-section, we propose another sub-scheme to achieve MNN location privacy in
NEMO-based VANET. In Section 5.6, we show that the probability of successfully violat-
ing the MNN’s location privacy, when our proposed fake point sub-scheme is employed,
decreases as the ratio (A/K) of the number of the attacker’s monitoring devices, A, to
the number of defined spatial grid points, K, increases. Since K is always much larger
than A, the probability of violating the MNN’s location is quite large. Therefore, we pro-
pose the second, cluster-based sub-scheme, so when it is combined with the fake point
scheme, the probability of violating the MNN’s location is decreased. The main idea of
the cluster-based sub-scheme is to divide the hotspot area into smaller cells, i.e., clusters,
and assign a new AP for each cell. Thus the MNN uses little power value to transmit
its messages, and so prevents an attacker’s monitoring devices from detecting the MNN’s
signals. Hence, the attacker cannot employ the positioning scheme to localize the MNN,
because the attacker cannot measure the RSS of the undetected transmission signal. The
cluster-based sub-scheme consists of three steps: NEMO bootstrapping, MNN attachment,
and reference point selection.
NEMO bootstrapping
At the time of constructing the Wi-Fi as NEMO-based VANET communications, the
OBU/MR that works as an AP for the whole network divides the network area into smaller
n sub-areas called cells, c1, c2, ...., cn. For each cell, ci, the OBU/MR assigns an AP, which
is a reference point, RPi, that works as a local AP for all MNNs located within a distance r
around RPi. Considering each cell’s coverage area as a circle, r represents the cell’s radius,
and we assume that all cells have the same radius, and they may overlap with each other
as depicted in Figure 5.6. From an attacker’s perspective, we consider that there is at most
one attacker’s monitoring device in each cell.
MNN attachment
Working as a local AP, each RP broadcasts a beacon packet so only MNNs under its
coverage area receive this beacon. The beacon message contains information about the
RP, including its identity, IDRP , its coverage area’s radius, r, and its required received
signal’s power, PRRP .
Considering the knowledge of its location, (XMNN , YMNN), the MNN calculates the
transmission signal power for its messages directed to its chosen RP, as follows:







Figure 5.6: Cluster based sub-scheme
TPMNN = PRRP × FSPL (5.22)
where FSPL is the free space path loss [114], which depends on the cell’s radius in meters,
r, and the transmitted signal frequency in megahertz, f .
Reference point selection
When an MNN attaches to the hotspot, it receives m beacons from m different RPs.
The MNN sorts the received m beacons’ signals’ powers, and chooses the RP with the
strongest signal to be its local AP. As depicted in Figure 5.6, the MNN transmits all its
messages with the calculated low transmission power to the selected RP, which in turn,
retransmits the messages to the OBU/MR that works as the hotspot’s AP.
5.5.3 Fake Point-Cluster based Location Privacy Scheme
In our cluster based sub-scheme, since clusters can be spatially overlapped, the MNN’s
transmitted signals may be received by many clusters, not only the intended cluster.
Therefore, if one attacker’s monitoring device is in each cluster, the monitoring devices
in the clusters that receive the MNN’s signals can collude to reveal the MNN’s location
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by applying a statistical positioning scheme. To increase the MNN’s location privacy, a
combination of the fake point based and the cluster based sub-schemes can be applied.
In addition to receiving OBU/MR beacon messages, the MNN also receives some RPs’
beacon messages that contain RPs’ positions, {(XRP1 , Y RP1), (XRP2 , Y RP2), .........., (XRPm , Y RPm)}.
After calculating its transmission power as depicted in the cluster-based sub-scheme, the
MNN randomly selects a fake point that is located in its cluster.
Using the fake point sub-scheme, the MNN calculates the required power at the fake
point and then adjusts its transmit power to this power. Therefore, the MNN confuses
some of the attacker’s monitoring devices, and hence increases the estimation error resulting
from the attacker’s monitoring devices’ collusion.
This combination between the fake point and the cluster-based sub-schemes prevents
some attacker’s monitoring devices located inside neighbor clusters from detecting the
sender’s transmitted signals. In addition, the fake point-cluster based selects a fake point
inside the sender’s cluster, in order to ensure higher location privacy and consume lower
power.
5.6 Analytical Location Privacy Evaluation
In this section, an analytical analysis for the proposed scheme, the fake point-cluster based
scheme, is presented. Similar to the evaluation analysis in [115], we employ three metrics:
correctness, accuracy, and certainty. Correctness measures the additional estimation error
that is added by our proposed scheme; accuracy measures the probability of an attacker’s




When m different MNNs choose the same fake point, which in turn may be a location of
an attacker’s monitoring device, the attacker estimation error for the MNN’s localization








where A, B, C, D, α, and β are a signal’s parameters that can be estimated by the
attacker. However, the attacker cannot estimate the MNN’s transmission power, Pt, while
the distance, d, to the target MNN is also unknown. Using Frii’s formula, Pt can be
expressed as:




where Gt and Gr are the sending and receiving channel’s gains. Therefore, substituting
(5.24) in (5.23), RSS can be written as:
RSS =




A−B − dα − C(log10 d)β −D
(5.25)
By (5.25), the attacker can measure the RSS values, RSS1, RSS2,...... RSSm, for m
different MNNs that select the same fake point in the fake point sub-scheme, as follows:
RSSi =




A−B − dα − C(log10 d)β −D
(5.26)
where c is the speed of light and f is the signal’s frequency, which is one of the channel
parameters. Assuming 2.4 GHZ is the frequency band that is used in the hotspot, m MNNs
select any of the 14 channels that are assigned in this band. The channels’ frequency bands




are negligible. Thus, (5.26) yields the same RSS’s value for all MNNs that share the same
fake point.
From (5.26), the attacker estimates the distance between its location, which is the fake
point’s location, (xf , yf ), and the target-point’s location, (xi, yi) as follows:
di =
√
(xi − xf )2 + (yi − yf )2 (5.27)
Since di,i = 1, 2, ....m has the same value and (xf , yf ) is a fixed point for all MNNs, then
the attacker calculates the same estimated location (xe, ye) for an MNNi’s true location
(xi, yi). Hence, (5.4) is expressed as follows:
Zi = di + ηi + δi, δ ≥ 0 (5.28)
where δi is a deviation of the estimated distance that is added when applying the fake






Therefore, (5.4) changes as follows:
Z = d+ η + δ, δ ≥ 0 (5.30)
The attacker then uses ML estimation as in (5.13) to determine the MNN’s position as
follows:

















where N is the number of an attacker’s monitoring devices. Note that the term
δ2i +2δiηi
σ2i
is the added value to the ML estimation. The additional estimation error is called the
correctness of the estimated position and, as it increases, the MNN’s location privacy
increases as well.
Cluster based sub-scheme
The goal of this sub-scheme is to decrease the transmit power by employing transmit
power control in such a way that only a small number of an attacker’s monitoring devices, L,
from all monitor devices, N, can detect the MNN’s signal and measure the RSS. Therefore,
the attacker calculates the ML estimation as follows:







For L = 1, which means only one monitoring device can detect the MNN’s signal, (5.32)






where δcluster is the added estimation error resulting from the lack of information as only one
monitoring device measures the MNN’s RSS. δcluster decreases as the number of monitoring
devices increases, which in turn, gives an indication of a lower location privacy level.
Fake point-cluster based scheme Depending on the analysis of both fake point and
cluster based sub-schemes, the estimation error for the combination of the two sub-schemes
can be expressed as follows:






















In this sub-section, the accuracy of the fake point-cluster based scheme is calculated by
measuring the accuracy of the positioning system employed by the attacker. We measure
the accuracy of the positioning system by calculating the probability of attacking the
hotspot while our proposed scheme is implemented. According to the fake point sub-scheme
explained in Section 5.5.1, the accuracy of this sub-scheme depends on the possibility of
confusing the attacker by having many MNNs select the same fake point and having an
attacker’s monitoring device located in this fake point. Assuming that the hotspot is
spatially divided into K grid points that the OBU/MR periodically sends to all MNNs,
the probability that at least two MNNs select the same fake point from those K points is
calculated using the birthday paradox probability as follows:
Pr(x ≥ 2) = 1− K!
(K − u)!Ku
(5.35)
where u > 1 is the number of MNNs in the hotspot. In addition, the probability that
the selected fake point is an attacker’s monitoring device’s location is A
K
, where A is the
number of an attacker’s monitoring devices in the network. Therefore, combining the two
probabilities, the probability that an attacker’s monitoring device is located at the fake
point’s location selected by at least two different MNNs can be calculated as follows:






























Figure 5.7: Fake point sub-scheme attacking probability.
Since the number of passengers inside the hotspot is always much less than the defined
spatial grid points(u  K), we consider K!
(K−u)!Ku ≈ 0. Therefore, the probability of
successfully attacking the hotspot when employing the fake point sub-scheme (Figure 5.7)
is calculated as follows:
Pr(fake− pointattacking) = 1− A
K
(5.37)
As illustrated in the figure, the probability of attacking decreases when the ratio (A/K)
of the number of the attacker’s monitoring devices, A, to the number of defined spatial grid
points, K, increases, because the possibility that the selected fake point is an attacker’s
monitoring device’s location increases and hence the attacker is confused. Intuitively, this
ratio increases when A increases and/or K decreases.
For the cluster-based sub-scheme, the number of overlapping clusters, O, that intersect
with the MNN’s cluster affects the probability of achieving an MN’s location privacy. This
probability is calculated as follows:
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As shown in Figure 5.8, we define the maximum number of overlapping clusters, and
hence number of attacker monitoring devices, as four.
Combining the fake point with cluster-based probabilities, we get the probability of














Figure 5.9 shows the combination of fake point and cluster-based probabilities.
5.6.3 Certainty
An entropy model measures the uncertainty of an attacker’s location privacy scheme, cal-
culated as follows:
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Therefore, the entropy for our proposed schemes is depicted in Figure 5.10.
5.7 Performance Evaluation
In this section, a simulation has been run to evaluate the performance of the fake point-
cluster based scheme. We simulate a 45m × 45m hotspot that is installed inside one
of the vehicles connected together to create VANET communications. To simulate the
overlapping clusters, a group of reference points has been deployed in such a way that each
reference point, RPi, covers an area of 25m
2, with one meter overlapping area with each
neighbor cluster. The centralized AP as well as all RPs define specific received powers that
each MNN must consider while sending its signals to AP or any RP. Table5.1 shows our
simulation parameters.
To show the impact of integrating NEMO protocol with VANET, Figure 5.11 presents
the total sender’s handover time when applying NEMO, MIPv6, and MIPv4 protocols.
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Figure 5.10: Fake Point Cluster based entropy.
Table 5.1: NEMO-based VANET Simulation Parameters.
Road width 5500m× 10m
Road’s network size 1000m× 10m
Road’s networks number 6
Spatial grid points, K 1000
Vehicles number 36000
WiFi size 45m× 45m
Wi-Fi nodes number 600
Frequency 2.4GHz
AP transmission power 5mW ' 7dBm
cluster area 25m2
AP required received power 5dBm
Cluster required received power 3dBm
overlapping area among clusters 1m
Length of the phy header 0byte
Thermal noise 0dB
Compared to other mobility protocols, a sender employing NEMO BS protocol requires
the smallest handover delay, because only the MR implements the NEMO-BS, hence the de-
laying cost is distributed over all MNNs inside the Wi-Fi. In addition, this delay constantly
increases with the vehicle speeds, allowing our scheme to be used for scalable networks. On
the other hand, for the MIPv6 and MIPv4 protocols, the handover delays increase linearly
with vehicle speeds, because the number of handovers increases accordingly. The MIPv6
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Figure 5.11: Total handover delay.
protocol costs much more delay than that in the MIPv4 protocol, because of the addition
of the correspondent binding update messages transmitted to the sender’s correspondent
nodes.
Calculating the total message’s routing delay, Figure 5.12 shows that NEMO protocol
achieves 95% and 97% decreases comparing to the delays in MIPv6 and MIPv4, respec-
tively.
Figure 5.13 shows the MNN transmission power for the fake point-cluster based, fake
point sub-scheme, cluster based sub-scheme, and the original Wi-Fi communication scheme
as a reference. As shown in the figure, the original communication scheme where a fake
point-cluster based scheme is not implemented has the smallest transmission power. On
the other hand, there is a 65.5% power increase when employing the fake point sub-scheme
because the selected fake point can be found very far from the MNN, thus more power at
MNN is needed to equalize RSS at this fake point. The power required in the cluster-based
sub-scheme depends on the received power at the RP, which is always less than the received
power at the AP; therefore, only a 37.5% increase in MNN transmission power is recorded.
Compared to the fake point sub-scheme, when combining the fake point sub-scheme with
the cluster-based sub-scheme, we get a 23% decrease in the transmission power. The reason
for this power saving is that when employing the fake point-cluster based scheme, the MNN
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Figure 5.12: Message routing delay.
selects a nearer fake point, located in its cluster.
The distances between MNNs and APs contribute to increasing MNNs’ transmission
power, as illustrated in Figure 5.14. The shortest distance between MNN and AP, which
is employed in an MNN-AP conventional scheme, always requires less transmission power,
while the indirect distances from an MNN to the fake point then to the AP, which are
employed in our proposed schemes, consume more power. Compared to the reference
MNN-AP conventional scheme, the fake point, cluster-based, and fake point-cluster based
schemes encounter distance increases of 135%, 17.6%, and 52.9%, respectively.
The increases in distances and powers are our cost to achieve high MNN location
privacy. Figure 5.15 shows power consumed at different MNN-AP distances. Our proposed
schemes achieve lower power consumptions than that in the conventional scheme at MNN-
AP distances less than 5 meters. At such small distances, the location protection is much
more important than it is at the large distances where MNNs locations can be revealed
easily. Therefore, at lower distances, the fake point-cluster scheme achieves both less power
consumption and high location privacy, while the conventional scheme has higher power
consumption without protecting the MNN location.
In Section 5.6, we calculate the entropy of our proposed scheme, which relies on the
probability that many MNNs have the same fake point. In this section, as shown in Figure
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Figure 5.13: MNN transmission power.

























Figure 5.14: MNN-AP route distances.
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Figure 5.15: Average power consumption at different distances.
5.16 and Figure 5.17, we practically measure the histogram for both the fake point sub-
scheme and fake-point cluster scheme, respectively. In Figure 5.16, the number of MNNs
that select the same point reaches 6 while in Figure 5.17, it reaches 90 out of 300 MNNs.
This difference occurs because in the fake point sub-scheme, each MNN can select its fake
point among large varieties of fake points that are distributed all over the network, while
in the fake point-cluster based scheme, these varieties have shrunk to only fake points in
neighbor clusters. Therefore, the fake point-cluster scheme achieves higher location privacy
than does the fake point sub-scheme.
5.8 Summary
In this chapter, in addition to the anonymity and location privacy schemes proposed in
Chapter 3, and the multi-hop authentication scheme proposed in Chapter 4, we observe
that location privacy in a network’s lower-layers is a prerequisite for those higher-layer
security schemes. Therefore, we adapt the ideas of the obfuscation and power variability
to propose an efficient physical-layer location privacy scheme, the fake point-cluster based
scheme. The proposed scheme thwarts physical-layer attackers occurring inside a public
hotspot in a moving vehicle, in order to ensure mobile network nodes’ location privacy.
The physical-layer attacker in our model exploits the wireless positioning systems, which
are used for localization in a location-based system, to detect the mobile network node’s
location. Working in the physical layer where the signals are openly propagated and cannot
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Figure 5.16: Fake point histogram.






















Figure 5.17: Fake point cluster based histogram.
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be hidden, this attacker is a challenge to be mitigated. The attacker deploys a number
of monitoring devices in the hotspot installed inside the moving vehicle. When an MNN
transmits a signal to the mobile router, each monitoring device estimates the distance to
this MNN by measuring the received signal strength (RSS) and sends the estimation to
the attacker that uses the estimations to localize the MNN.
The fake point-cluster based scheme involves two sub-schemes, the fake point and the
cluster based. The idea of the fake point sub-scheme, adaptation of obfuscation, is to
increase the attacker confusion when measuring senders’ received signals strengths. There-
fore, the monitoring devices’ estimation errors increase and consequently the localization
error increases as well. In addition, the idea of the cluster-based sub-scheme is to decrease
the number of monitoring devices that can detect the MNN’s signals, meaning fewer mon-
itoring devices can estimate the distances to the MNN. Combining the two sub-schemes
increases the overall network performance, as well as ensuring the sender’s location privacy.
Employing the correctness, accuracy, and certainty as metrics, we analytically mea-
sure the location privacy achieved by our proposed scheme. In addition, using extensive
simulations, we evaluate the performance of the hotspot in NEMO-based VANET when
employing our proposed scheme comparing to the traditional hotspots. Furthermore, we
show that our proposed scheme can practically be implemented, due to the possibility of
having at least two nodes select the same fake point.
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Chapter 6
Conclusions and Future work
In this chapter, we present the main research results and discuss future work.
6.1 Major Research Results
Having the goal of securing a mobility management protocol that supports mobile nodes
with seamless communications, this research has proposed three security and privacy
schemes employed in three different mobility management for VANET scenarios. In our
proposed schemes, we have considered the VANET mobility management challenges, in-
cluding high speed vehicles, multi-hop communications, and scalability.
In Chapter 3, based on onion routing and anonymizer, we have proposed an anonymity
and location privacy scheme, ALLP, to be employed in MIPv6 heterogeneous mobile net-
works, such as VANETs. With the goal of securing MIPv6 home binding update and
return routability signalling messages, the ALPP scheme involves two complementary sub-
schemes, anonymous home binding update (AHBU) and anonymous return routability
(ARR). In addition, using the certificate-less public key cryptography, we present an effi-
cient and secure authentication scheme between the mobile node and the foreign gateway.
The proposed authentication scheme allows the two parties to authenticate each other
without constructing a public key infrastructure in the network. Using the entropy model,
we compare the achieved degree of anonymity of our proposed scheme with the mix-based
scheme. When increasing the number of senders in our system, we observe that the degree
of anonymity of our proposed scheme falls between 60% and 85%, whereas the mix-based
scheme encounters a high delay while increasing the degree of anonymity. Regarding the
115
location privacy, we prove that when implementing the ALPP scheme, no network entity
except the mobile node itself can identify this node’s location, which is represented by the
mobile node’s care-of address. Furthermore, we prove that when using our proposed key
establishment scheme and under the assumption that the attacker knows the mobile node’s
private key, the attacker is still unable to create the shared key between the mobile node
and the foreign gateway. In addition, we also prove that if either the mobile node identity
or its public key is changed by an attacker, our proposed key establishment can detect this
forgery. Therefore, based on these proofs, we show that the ALPP scheme thwarts traffic
analysis, collusion, replay, and man-in-the middle attacks. Using extensive simulations, we
show that our proposed sub-schemes decrease the routing delays by 42% for the AHBU
sub-scheme, 43% for ARR-fixed correspondent node, and 30% for ARR-mobile node, com-
pared to the triangle routing scheme. In our simulations, we consider different mobile node
speeds, and show that routing delays decrease with the high mobility networks, such as
VANETs.
In Chapter 4, another scenario for multi-hop PMIPv6 in VANETS has been address,
and a novel efficient mutual authentication scheme, EM3A has been proposed to be em-
ployed between a mobile node and a relay node in the multi-hop scenario. In addition, we
employ symmetric polynomials to generate a shared key between those nodes. Compared
to previous symmetric polynomial schemes that are used to generate a shared key between
two arbitrary nodes, our proposed scheme increases the secrecy level achieved in the key
establishment from t−secrecy to t × 2n−secrecy. This increase in secrecy level hardens
against colluder attacks, to the extent that they require at least t×2n+1 colluders instead
of only t+ 1 colluders to reveal the shared key and break the secure system. Furthermore,
we have mitigate the problem of mobile node’s revocation by proposing new security steps
that also achieve mobile node backward secrecy. Compared to the traditional revocation
that changes the whole system keys, our revocation scheme changes only the keys of the
mobile nodes sharing the same first-attached mobile access gateway (MAG). However, the
trad-off is to store an MAG’s list of identities in each authenticated mobile node. By means
of simulations, we have shown that EM3A results in a low delay and allows for seamless
communications, even in highly mobile/heavy traffic demanding scenarios. Moreover, we
present a case study of a proposed multi-hop authentication PMIP (MA-PMIP) that is
implemented in vehicular networks. EM3A has been implemented as the authentication
step in MA-PMIP and compared to the AMA-PMIP scheme that implements the AMA
authentication scheme, our MA-PMIP protocol with EM3A achieves 99.6% and 96.8%
reductions in authentication delay and communication overhead, respectively.
Finally, in Chapter 5, we direct our research to protect the mobile node’s location
privacy in the physical layer, which is a prerequisite to ensuring location privacy in upper-
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layers. Relating to our thesis, the scheme proposed in this chapter can be combined with
any schemes proposed in chapters 3 and 4. In this chapter, we consider the NEMO-based
VANET that supports public hotspots installed inside moving vehicles. We have modified
the ideas of the obfuscation and power variability to propose the fake point-cluster based
scheme, which thwarts physical-layer attacks that exploit a sender’s received signal strength
to localize this sender. The fake point-cluster based scheme involves two sub-schemes, the
fake point and the cluster-based, that together increase the network performance and
the achieved location privacy, rather than implementing each one separately. Using cor-
rectness, accuracy, and certainty, we have measured the location privacy achieved in our
proposed scheme. In addition, using extensive simulations, we evaluate the performance
of the hotspot in NEMO-based VANET when employing our proposed scheme compared
to the traditional hotspots. Lastly, we show that our proposed scheme can practically be
implemented, due to the possibility of having at least two nodes select the same fake point.
6.2 Future Work
Securing mobility management for vehicular ad hoc networks has many challenges. There-
fore, many research directions can be outlined to extend our research.
Securing Nested NEMO for Vehicular Ad Hoc Networks
Nested NEMO is a topology type of the NEMO mobile network in which a NEMO
mobile router manages the mobility of another mobile routers located in the same mo-
bile network or in neighbor networks. Due to its inefficiency and highly routing delay,
such a topology is considered a problem when it occurs in mobile networks, especially
with vehicular networks due to their high mobility. Therefore, the trend is to propose
a route optimization for nested NEMO, which mobile routers use to communicate with
the correspondent nodes instead of directing the messages to all mobile router’s home
agents. Despite the great number of studies that have been done, there has been no route
optimization standard issued yet.
As a next step of our proposal, we will suggest a route optimization scheme to be
employed for nested NEMO-based VANETs. Unlike previous schemes, we will consider
both the efficiency and the network security for the proposed scheme.
Securing Mobility Management for Electrical Vehicles
During the 1970s and ’80s, the increase of investment in Canada’s electrical grid was
very noticeable. However, recently, with the overwhelming growth in electricity demand
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versus supply, coupled with the aging network facilities, catastrophic blackouts, such as
the 2012 India blackouts, happen frequently. Therefore, Smart Grid, a worldwide trend,
has been developed to support efficient and reliable electricity transformation by enabling
time-of-use pricing, where electricity prices changes based on the time of the day. The idea
is to create two-way communication between consumers and suppliers, to transform both
the electricity and the information about the consumed power. The customers’ interac-
tions, resulting when the supplier supports them with real-time information about their
consumed power, allow balancing of the electricity grid in its peak hours, and hence de-
crease the blackout probability. Benefits of the smart grid include self-healing from power
disturbance events, enabling active participation by consumers in demand response, op-
erating resiliently against physical and cyber attack, accommodating all generation and
storage options, increasing investment, and optimizing assets and efficient operation.
As an application of the Smart Grid, electric vehicles increase the benefits, including
lower operating and maintaining cost, reduced vehicle noise and making the “green” choice,
and increased energy efficiency. Therefore, the Canadian government’s vision is to have
one electric vehicle among every 20 vehicles by 2020. The battery of the electrical vehicle is
powered by plugging it in to the electricity grid in order to store energy. Accordingly, a new
communication, namely Vehicle to Grid (V2G), has been considered recently. Furthermore,
supporting seamless communication in V2G, where the activated IP connection of the
electric vehicle is not interrupted while the vehicle is moving through different networks,
is required.
In our future work, the security and privacy of the electrical vehicle in such commu-
nication will be considered. The smart grid uses Bad Data Detector (BDD) techniques
to indicate erroneous measurements, however false data injection attacks could carefully
change a selected set of measurements to add arbitrary errors in the state estimations with-
out triggering the BDD’s alarm. In addition, unauthorized customers and fake suppliers
could steal electricity and deceive other entities in the grid. Moreover, privacy attack-
ers may analyze the real-time transmitted data about customers and maliciously reveal
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